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A DOZEN LANDMARK NUISANCE CASES AND
THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL SIGNIFICANCE
Michael C. Blumm*

Over four centuries, nuisance law has proved its versatility. Originally a near strict
liability doctrine restraining uses that interfered with traditional agrarian and
domestic uses, nuisance evolved to accommodate the Industrial Revolution,
providing nuisance defendants with defenses like suitability of uses to their location;
use of best available technology; and a high standing bar for private plaintiffs
alleging public nuisances, making injunctive relief unlikely. In the mid-twentieth
century, the Restatements were interpreted by some courts to endorse wholesale
balancing of the gravity of harmful activities versus their economic value to the
defendant and society, not just limited to the issue of injunctive relief versus
damages, but whether a nuisance existed at all. This transformation of nuisance
doctrine, like the earlier transformation was the product of instrumentalism: a
perceived need to accommodate economic growth, as judges were able to deny
nuisance plaintiffs relief based on value judgments about the relative value of
development versus environmental quality.
In recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has intervened to stop federal nuisance law
from being applied to interstate pollution, including greenhouse gas emissions. The
Court did so not on the basis of congressional intent but on its visions of federalism
and judicial competency. While these decisions seem to remove nuisance law from
the foremost pollution threat in our time, the doctrine may regain relevance if the
Court proceeds to narrowly interpret the scope of federal environmental legislation
protecting resources like isolated wetlands and groundwater, thereby eliminating
displacement arguments. If those resources are not federally regulated, nuisance
doctrine would give injured landowners a remedy, just as it has afforded those
injured by emissions from hog farms, recently the subject of multimillion dollar
damage suits.

*
Jeffrey Bain Faculty Scholar & Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law
School. Many thanks to the participants in the “Nuisance as a Regulatory Tool Roundtable”
at Northwestern Law School on April 18–19, 2019, especially David Dana, Janice Nadler,
Jill Fraley, Albert Lin, Connor Reynolds, Hari Osofsky, Mark Nevitt, Peter Brandt, Kalyani
Robbins, Nancy Loeb, and the late John Nagle. Cyd Maurer, 3L, Lewis and Clark Law,
provided helpful research, and Mitchell Theilemann, 3L, Lewis and Clark Law, was superb
with the footnotes.
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This Article traces the evolution of nuisance law, examining a dozen landmark
cases, revealing a doctrine that began by protecting traditional agrarian and
domestic uses, yet was malleable enough to accommodate perceived development
priorities in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The Article does suggest that
where not federally displaced or preempted by state statutes, nuisance law today
remains a viable cause of action for injured landowners, particularly where the
issue is left to juries. Given the evident hostility of the Supreme Court, nuisance may
not be available to combat greenhouse gas emissions, despite the felt necessities of
the twenty-first century like the evident damages due to unrestrained atmospheric
pollution and ocean acidification. But nuisance doctrine could supply injured
parties a remedy against unregulated activities. Those parties might encourage
courts to rediscover nuisance’s strict liability roots and return the doctrine to its
origins: protecting against uses that inflict substantial injuries on their neighbors
and the public at large.
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INTRODUCTION
Nuisance, once called the “dust-bin of the law,”1 or worse,2 has become
more prominent in recent years as statutory and regulatory measures have been
unable to protect the public from neighboring harms.3 From the Old French word
nuisir, meaning “to harm,”4 courts early on interpreted nuisance to prevent harm to
traditional domestic and agrarian uses, invoking the Latin phrase sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedas (use your property so as not to interfere with other people’s).5
Originally imposing something close to strict liability, nuisance historically was
elastic enough to combat odors, 6 smoke, 7 vibrations, 8 and, more recently, hog

1.
Albert C. Lin, Public Trust and Public Nuisance: Common Law Peas in a
Pod?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1075, 1082 (2012) (citing Awad v. McColgan, 98 N.W.2d 571,
573 (Mich. 1959) (“Nuisance is the great grab bag, the dust bin, of the law. It comprehends
interference with an owner’s reasonable use and enjoyment of his property by means of
smoke, noise, or vibration; the obstruction of private easements and rights of support;
interference with public rights, such as free passage along streams and highways, the
enjoyment of public parks and places of recreation, and, in addition, activities and structures
prohibited as statutory nuisances.”).
2.
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 86, at 571 (4th
ed. 1971) (“There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word ‘nuisance.’”).
3.
The term nuisance can mean either a private nuisance or public nuisance. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A (AM. LAW INST. 1979). Private nuisance is a
nontrespassory but substantial and unreasonable use interfering with neighboring
landowners’ use and enjoyment of land. Id. § 821D. Public nuisance, on the other hand, is a
substantial and unreasonable interference with public rights. Id. § 821B; see also infra notes
28–32, 46 and accompanying text.
4.
See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 1548 (3d ed. 2002).
5.
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, OXFORD REFERENCE,
https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100504563
(last
visited Apr. 4, 2020).
6.
See, e.g., City of Fort Smith v. Western Hide & Fur Co., 239 S.W. 724, 725–
26 (Ark. 1922) (defendant’s hide and fur sales operation, which emitted offensive odors and
attracted flies, was a public nuisance, even though it possessed a license from the city; the
distinction between public and private nuisance “lies merely in the extent of the injury or
annoyance . . .”).
7.
See generally, e.g., Atlanta Processing Co. v. Brown, 179 S.E.2d 752, 754 (Ga.
1971) (stating that a jury was justified in finding that the defendant’s animal processing plant
emitting gases, fumes, and smoke with a “strong, pungent and nauseating odor,” was a public
nuisance).
8.
See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Gault, 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952)
(noise and vibrations from defendant’s compressor gas station that greatly disturbed
neighbors created a public nuisance).
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feedlots 9 and greenhouse gas (“GHG”) pollution, 10 although the ability of the
doctrine to provide remedies against GHG emitters is doubtful as of this writing.11
Defendants in nuisance cases have long invoked a variety of defenses, like
the suitability of the alleged nuisance to its location or use of best available means
to reduce interference, to reduce their liability.12 A prominent defense is the concept
of “special injury,” or injury that is different in kind from that suffered by the general
public.13 Generalized public injuries, the theory goes, are remedied only by actions
brought by public officials, not private litigants.14 Other public nuisance cases have
faltered recently on grounds of statutory displacement of federal common law
nuisance remedies,15 under a Supreme Court opinion finding displacement by the
federal Clean Air Act. 16 The displacement cases seemed to ignore congressional
intent in favor of the Court’s vision of separation of powers and judicial competency,
both of which serve an antiregulatory agenda.17
Despite the recent success of some nuisance defendants at avoiding judicial
consideration of the merits of nuisance allegations,18 the ancient doctrine should not
9.
See, e.g., Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Iowa 1998)
(interpreting the effect of a right-to-farm statute); Labrayere v. Bohr Farms, LLC, 458 S.W.3d
319 (Mo. 2015) (same); H. Claire Brown, North Carolina Jury Awards Neighbors $473.5
Million in Smithfield Hog Waste Suit, COUNTER (Aug. 3, 2018), https://thecounter.org/northcarolina-jury-fines-smithfield-foods-nuisance-lawsuit-hog-farm-manure/; infra Section I.L
(discussing McKiver v. Murphy-Brown).
10.
See cases cited infra notes 15–16.
11.
See infra notes 187–95 and accompanying text.
12.
See infra notes 35, 48, 105, 136, 187–89, 192–93 and accompanying text.
13.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“In
order to recover damages in an individual action for a public nuisance, one must have suffered
harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the public exercising the right
common to the general public that was the subject of interference.”); see also Hopi Tribe v.
Ariz. Snowbowl Resort Ltd. P’ship, 430 P.3d 362, 371 (Ariz. 2018) (concluding that the Tribe
did not suffer “special injury” because “anyone and everyone who visits the Peaks, not just
the Tribe, will suffer substantial environmental harm.”); infra notes 97–103 and
accompanying text.
14.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 821C(1).
15.
City of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934. 937 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (currently on appeal); City of New York v. BP P.L.C, 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 472
(S.D.N.Y. 2018); City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1024–26 (N.D. Cal.
2018) (foreclosing cities’ claims on the ground that federal courts need to defer to the
legislative and executive branches in international matters); infra notes 192–93.
16.
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 423–24 (2011) (deciding
that the Clean Air Act displaced federal common law, relying on City of Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1981)); see infra Section I.K; see also infra notes 171–80 and
accompanying text.
17.
See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 428 (“It is altogether fitting that
Congress designated an expert agency, here, EPA, as best suited to serve as primary regulator
of greenhouse gas emissions. The expert agency is surely better equipped to do the job than
individual district judges issuing ad hoc, case-by-case injunctions. Federal judges lack the
scientific, economic, and technological resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues
of this order.”).
18.
See Albert C. Lin, Dodging Public Nuisance, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021).
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be dismissed as anachronistic. As this Article illustrates, the flexibility inherent in
nuisance balancing—in which modern courts assess the gravity of the harm suffered
by plaintiffs19 against the utility of the defendant’s conduct20—has been repeatedly
invoked to affect actions damaging to the public interest, most recently against North
Carolina hog farms.21 Beginning in the early seventeenth century, for the last 400
years nuisance doctrine has been a prominent part of Anglo-American law,
sometimes restraining new developments, sometimes ratifying them.22 What had
been a doctrine skeptical of new developments and fitted to protect an agrarian
society from change became, during the Industrial Revolution, a malleable principle
that often accommodated industrial development through changing the definition of
what constituted a nuisance.23 Over the years, nuisance has shown itself to be a
flexible doctrine capable of adapting to the felt conditions of the times. 24 If not
19.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 827 (“In determining the gravity of the harm from
an intentional invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following
factors are important: (a) The extent of the harm involved; (b) the character of the harm
involved; (c) the social value that the law attaches to the type of use or enjoyment invaded;
(d) the suitability of the particular use or enjoyment invaded to the character of the locality;
and (e) the burden on the person harmed of avoiding the harm.”).
20.
Id. § 828 (“In determining the utility of conduct that causes an intentional
invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land, the following factors are
important: (a) the social value that the law attaches to the primary purpose of the conduct; (b)
the suitability of the conduct to the character of the locality; and (c) the impracticability of
preventing or avoiding the invasion.”).
21.
See infra Section I.L.
22.
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 17801960 74–78 (1977).
23.
Id. at 76–77 (discussing the evolution of public nuisance doctrine to include
defenses to private damage claims, especially during the transportation revolution; while the
formal doctrine, according to Professor Horwitz, “appeared to change very little, judges began
to establish a variety of ingenious variations . . . [t]he effect of [which] was that individuals
who sought damages due to injuries from great works of public improvement were frequently
denied the benefits of a nuisance doctrine that . . . seemed to provide the injured party with
all the advantages.”); see also Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial
Nuisance Injunctions—Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 623 (1976)
(explaining that had nuisance law not evolved away from its strict liability origins, the
doctrine would have posed a substantial threat to the industrial revolution, since “[c]onsistent
application of the 18th-century standard of nuisance law in the 19th century would have
burdened the entrepreneur with a heavy potential liability,” possibly stifling economic
development progress due to the potential liability); Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions
and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 775, 779–85 (1986) (describing “a
profound revolution” of nuisance law in the nineteenth century from its property origins
(providing redress against acts on the defendant’s land interfered with use of the plaintiff’s
land) to tort law (incorporating defenses of “fault” and “reasonableness”), thereby decreasing
liability).
24.
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the
law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent
moral and political theories, [and] intuitions of public policy . . . have had a good deal more
to do with the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law
embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt
with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In order to
know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.”).
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displaced through court interpretation nor preempted by statutes, the doctrine
remains capable of playing an important role in curbing unregulated pollution and
in supplying remedies for neighbors injured by poorly regulated animal feedlots.25
This Article illustrates the adaptability of nuisance law to respond to
evolving technologies and scientific methods of ascertaining harm. Nuisance may
continue to evolve in the future, as harms continue to outstrip legislatures’ abilities
to anticipate and combat them.
The Article focuses on 12 landmark nuisance cases in Part I, beginning in
1610 and decided as recently as 2018. These cases illustrate the doctrine’s protean
nature in light of changing technological and scientific changes that swept through
Anglo-American life in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and still do so. Part
II draws some lessons from this case law. The Article concludes that although
nuisance defendants may be able to derail some cases on a variety of procedural and
substantive grounds, if courts reach the merits of plaintiffs' claims, the history of
nuisance law suggests plaintiffs’ prospects of success are not trivial, especially in
jury trials.

I. LANDMARK PUBLIC NUISANCE CASES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
Originally a common law crime, the Crown exclusively prosecuted public
nuisance claims, typically for interferences with public access to watercourses or
roadways. 26 Eventually, common law courts allowed citizens to bring public
nuisance claims to address public concerns, including environmental issues like

25.
See infra Section I.L. Regulatory measures like pollution control statutes or
local zoning ordinances do not provide injured landowners with compensation for their
injuries, so there is no conceptual reason why regulatory measures cannot coexist with
common law remedies like nuisance.
26.
See WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS 617–18 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing the earliest
English nuisance cases, which “involved purprestures, which were encroachments upon the
royal domain or the public highway . . . [t]here was enough of a superficial resemblance
between the blocking of a private right of way and the blocking of a public highway to keep
men contented with calling the latter a nuisance,” thereby birthing the doctrine of public
nuisance); see also ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR. & EDWARD D. RE, EQUITY: CASES AND
MATERIALS 794–95 (4th ed. 1958) (discussing sixteenth-century writs that, while not directed
toward wrongs on private land, showed that medieval courts were aware of the desirability of
specific relief against nuisances. The first reported case appears to be Osburne v. Barter, Ch.
Cas. in Ch. 176 (1583), involving a defendant’s new mill which interfered with the
watercourse used by the plaintiff. By 1650, equitable relief could be had “[w]here an action
upon the case for a Nusans [sic] and damages only are to be recovered, the party may have
help here to remove or restore the thing itself.”); see also Daniel R. Coquillette, Mosses From
an Old Manse: Another Look at Some Historic Property Cases About the Environment, 65
CORNELL L. REV. 761, 775 (1979); Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Public Nuisance at the
Crossroads: Policing the Intersection Between Statutory Primacy and Common Law, 15
CHAP. L. REV. 495, 502 (2012).
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breathing clean air.27 This evolution epitomized the adaptability of nuisance law, as
the case law confirms.
Plaintiffs can bring either private or public nuisance claims, but the two
causes of action are not mutually exclusive.28 Although private nuisance inquiries
concern a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of
land, 29 a public nuisance claim focuses on the existence of an unreasonable
interference with a right common to the public. 30 Thus, an activity could be
simultaneously a public and private nuisance. Public nuisance offers the prospect of
damages to private plaintiffs only if they suffer special injury different from that
suffered by the general public.31
A. Aldred v. Benton
The first landmark case was a private nuisance case, 32 a 1611 dispute
involving a London pigsty owned by Thomas Benton. A neighboring landowner,
William Aldred, sued to enjoin Benton’s business, claiming that the odors emanating
from the pigsty made the air surrounding his residence unbreathable and blocked
natural light.33 Benton responded that his pigsty was “necessary for the sustenance
of man” and maintained that Aldred “ought not to have such a delicate nose.”34
These defenses—involving the utility of the defendant’s conduct and an allegedly
27.
See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 26, at 629–30, 651–52 (discussing
unreasonable interference in industrial pollution also well as general public nuisance category
for uses adversely affecting the environment, and therefore the “use and enjoyment of private
property.” Public nuisance involves a “continuing course of conduct that results in physical
harm or economic loss to so many persons as to become a matter of serious concern.”); infra
Section I.B (discussing the St. Helens Smelting case).
28.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
29.
Id. § 821D.
30.
Id. § 821B.
31.
Id. § 821C (“In order to maintain a proceeding to enjoin to abate a public
nuisance, one must (a) have the right to recover damages . . . , or (b) have authority as a public
official or public agency to represent the state or a political subdivision in the matter, or (c)
have standing to sue as a representative of the general public, as a citizen in a citizen’s action
or as a member of a class in a class action.”). Thus, according to the Restatement, special
injury may not be necessary if plaintiffs seek purely injunctive relief and otherwise establish
standing to sue. See Barry R. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private Remedies,
131 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1440 (1983). A lack of special injury was recently fatal to the Hopi
Tribe’s effort to enjoin artificial snowmaking with reclaimed wastewater at Arizona’s
Snowbowl Resort, located on national forest land that is a sacred site to the tribe. See infra
notes 97–103 and accompanying text (discussing the Hopi Tribe case).
32.
Public and private nuisance share a common heritage. See Donald G. Gifford,
Public Nuisance as a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 791–92 (2003)
(“To suggest . . . that public nuisance and private nuisance have little in common and are
unrelated is to ignore more than eight hundred years of intertwined history. The confusion
between the two results not from occasional recent misunderstandings by courts or law
students, but from a shared heritage—an understanding of which can assist us in the current
task of elucidating the appropriate parameters of public nuisance in the contemporary
context.”).
33.
Aldred v. Benton (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816, 9 Co. Rep. 57 b.
34.
Id. at 816–17.
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overly sensitive plaintiff—would be raised repeatedly in ensuing nuisance cases
over the years.35
Sir Christopher Wray, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, rejected Benton’s
defenses, ruling that Aldred’s injury involved a matter of necessity: his access to
light and his ability to breathe “wholesome air.” 36 The court announced that, as
expressed in the old Latin maxim of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedus, neighbors
must use their property so as not to interfere with each other.37 Benton violated this
“golden” rule by producing odors that deprived Aldred’s right to enjoy his home.
Even without evident physical damage to the residence itself, the court granted
Aldred an injunction against the operation of the pigsty.38 The court also awarded
damages for the injury sustained by Aldred for the loss of “wholesome air [and]
light,” although not for “prospect” (view), for that was “a matter only of delight, and
not of necessity.” 39 Benton’s utility defense was unavailing because his use
interfered with essential domestic uses like “wholesome air and light.” No balancing
was apparently warranted given the interference with these traditional uses.
The sic utere tuo maxim would become a staple of nuisance law,40 as courts
relied on it to enable landowners to restrain land uses that interfered with traditional

35.
Professor Coquillette maintained that Benton’s defense was the first time a
defendant raised utility as a defense. Coquillette, supra note 26, at 775. The utility defense
was central to the result in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement. See infra Section I.H.
36.
Aldred, 77 Eng. Rep. at 820–21 (announcing that the pigsty “for
stopping . . . of the wholesome air as of light, an action lies, and damages shall be recovered
for them, for both are necessary . . . . And the building of a lime-kiln is good and profitable;
but it if be built so near a house, that when it burns the smoke thereof enters into the house,
so that none can dwell there, an action lies for it.”).
37.
Id. at 821 (“Use your own property in such a way that you do not injure
others”).
38.
Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 523 (1897) (in a case involving a
rancher’s creative and unlawful fencing of private land that enclosed federal public lands, the
Supreme Court considered the fencing to be analogous to a public nuisance, observing that
there was “no right to maintain a structure . . . which, by reason of disgusting smells, loud or
unusual noises, thick smoke, noxious vapors, the jarring of machinery, or the unwarrantable
collection of flies, renders the occupancy of adjoining property dangerous, intolerable, or
even uncomfortable to its tenants . . . .”).
39.
Aldred, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
40.
See Camfield, 167 U.S. at 522–23 (“There is no doubt of the general
proposition that a man may do what he will with his own, but this right is subordinate to
another, which finds expression in the familiar maxim, ‘Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas.’
His right to erect what he pleases upon his own land will not justify him in maintaining a
nuisance, or in carrying on a business or trade that is offensive to his neighbors. Ever since
Aldred’s Case, it has been the settled law, both of this country and of England, that a man has
no right to maintain a structure upon his own land, which, by reason of disgusting smells,
loud or unusual noises, thick smoke, noxious vapors, the jarring of machinery, or the
unwarrantable collection of flies, renders the occupancy of adjoining property dangerous,
intolerable, or even uncomfortable to its tenants. No person maintaining such a nuisance can
shelter himself behind the sanctity of private property.”) (citations omitted).
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domestic and agrarian practices.41 According to Blackstone, even lawful activities
could be enjoined as nuisances. 42 But the Aldred court rejected nuisance claims
based on aesthetics, although it seemed to sanction actions brought by tenants as
well as landowners.43
Aldred made clear that physical damage to land was not a prerequisite to
obtaining relief; odors and loss of light due to air pollution were sufficient. The
decision also rejected Benton’s claims of social utility: no balancing of utility versus
interference was apparently appropriate when the interference was to essential
domestic uses. The nuisance law that existed before the nineteenth century was
grounded on notions of protecting the quiet enjoyment of landowners and providing
stability to the largely agrarian society that characterized both England and the
United States.44
B. St. Helen’s Smelting Co. v. Tipping
The antidevelopmental bias of nuisance doctrine remained evident in midnineteenth century law. Farmers and homeowners often invoked nuisance doctrine
against widespread injuries produced by new technologies like blast furnaces,
railroad operations, textile mills, and other manufacturing enterprises. 45 For
example, in St. Helen’s Smelting Co. v. Tipping, the owner of a 1300-acre country
manor in Lancashire in northwestern England successfully claimed that a copper
smelter a mile-and-a-half away produced large quantities of noxious vapors

41.
See HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 74 (“While other areas of the law were
changing to accommodate the growth of American industry, the law of nuisances for the
longest time appeared on its face to maintain the pristine purity of a preindustrial mentality.”).
42.
Emphasizing the importance of the suitability of the use to the location,
Blackstone declared that “if one does any other act, in itself lawful, which yet being done in
that place necessarily tends to the damage of another’s property, it is a nuisance: it is
incumbent on him to find some other place to do that acts, where it will be less offensive.”
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 217 (4th ed., 1771).
43.
It is not clear from the case report whether Aldred was an owner or lessee, but
the court seemed to recognize any possessory interest as sufficient to support a nuisance
plaintiff, suggesting that “anything done to the hurt or annoyance of the lands, tenements, or
hereditaments of another,” would suffice. Aldred, 77 Eng. Rep. at 216; see also Coquillette,
supra note 26, at 775 (“[A] person with any possessory interest in land inherited the ‘natural
rights’ of seisin protected by the historic assize of nuisance.”). However, “depriving one of a
mere matter of pleasure . . . [that] abridges nothing really convenient or necessary, is no injury
to the sufferer, and is therefore not an actionable nuisance.” Aldred, 77 Eng. Rep. at 217.
44.
See Reinhardt v. Menstasti (1885) 42, Ch. D. 685 (involving an oven placed
on the other side of the wall from a wine cellar); Commonwealth v. Perry, 29 N.E. 656, 657
(Mass. 1885) (gigantic piggery in the Boston suburbs that smelled like “the natural odor of
five hundred [pigs]”); CHAFEE & RE, supra note 26, at 795–96 (“Nuisance actions are one of
the oldest forms of town planning and social control over land use. Before 1750 they were
usually aimed at mismanagement of time-honored occupations.”).
45.
See Furrow, supra note 31, at 1439 (“[N]uisance cases in both England and
America arose during transitional stages between older community arrangements and
emerging industries. The industrial revolution spawned nuisance litigation by farmers and
homeowners on the troubled frontier of new technologies against textile mills, blast furnaces,
hydraulic mines, and cement plants.”).
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adversely affecting his trees, hedges, and plants, and therefore constituted a
nuisance.46
The smelter owner maintained that there was no nuisance because the area
surrounding the smelter was devoted largely to manufacturing, 47 invoking what
would become another staple of nuisance defendants: the suitability of the use to the
location.48 But the House of Lords disagreed, affirming a jury’s injunction against
the smelter after deciding that the smelter could not have been located in a “fit
place,” in light of the physical damage inflicted on neighboring properties.49 The
court concluded that the physical injuries to the neighboring trees and vegetation
negated the smelter’s societal benefit. 50 Although the decision announced that
nuisance cases should be “looked at from a reasonable point of view,” weighing all
factors and all circumstances,51 what mattered was the physical harm caused by the
defendant; the physical damage caused by the smelter seemed to impose a kind of

46.
(1865) 11 Eng. Rep. 1483, 1483, 1487. The decision did not distinguish
between public and private nuisance, which was typical of the nineteenth-century case law.
Public nuisance was originally a crime, becoming a tort for which damages could be awarded
only when a plaintiff could show “special damage” beyond that suffered by other affected
members of the public. See, e.g., Rose v. Miles (1815) 105 Eng. Rep. 773, 4 M&S 101
(recognizing a private claimant’s right to sue in public nuisance as a result of incurring special
damage). In the twentieth century, courts began to draw a distinction between public and
private nuisance, allowing public nuisance plaintiffs to recover for personal injuries as well
as damage to land. See, e.g., Thomas v. National Union of Mineworkers, 1 WLR 20 (Eng.
1986) (deciding that threats of the defendant were actionable under nuisance where they
interfered with a plaintiff’s right to use public roads and work); Attorney-General v. PYA
Quarries Ltd., 2 QB 169 (Eng. 1957) (ruling that, despite the difficulty in defining the
difference between a public and private nuisance, a public nuisance was a use that materially
affected the reasonable comfort or convenience); Lyons v. Gulliver, 83 LJ ch. 281 (Eng. 1914)
(deciding that an obstruction created by people often lining up for a theater show in front of
the plaintiff’s property was an actionable private nuisance).
47.
St. Helens Smelting, 11 Eng. Rep. at 1485 (“It cannot be asserted as an abstract
proposition of law that any act by which a man sends over his neighbour’s land that which is
noxious and hurtful is actionable, but the jury must be told to take into account the condition
of the other property in the neighborhood, the locality, and the other circumstances which
show the reasonable employment of the property, and even the employment of it in a
particular manner in that particular locality.”).
48.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 831 (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“An
intentional invasion of another’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land is unreasonable if
the harm is significant, and (a) the particular use or enjoyment interfered with is well suited
to the character of the locality; and (b) the actor’s conduct is unsuited to the character of that
locality.”).
49.
St. Helens Smelting, 11 Eng. Rep. at 1487. The court also rejected the smelter’s
proffered defenses of prescription and “coming to the nuisance.” Id. at 1485.
50.
Id. at 1487. The case suggested there was strict liability for tangible, physical
damage, regardless of the defendant’s costs or its social utility. See John P. McLaren,
Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution—Some Lessons from Social History, 3 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 157–58 (1983) (distinguishing cases with tangible damage, for which
liability “automatically followed, and those which [involved] inconvenience in which evident
circumstantial factors had to be considered.”).
51.
St. Helens Smelting, 11 Eng. Rep. at 1484.
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strict liability on the defendant.52 The case illustrated the potential of public nuisance
to have a significant effect on environmental quality, in this instance producing a
widespread improvement in air quality.53
C. Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co.
A landmark nineteenth-century California case exemplified the potential
effect of nuisance to restrain private land uses that adversely affected navigation and
water quality. Gold mining companies in the Yuba River Basin blasted the west
52.
The court seemed to restrict balancing of the equities to nonphysical damage
involving “personal discomfort” or a loss of amenities. Id. at 1486. Nuisance law has often
been invoked against odors, dust, and vibrations. See Lin, supra note 1, at 1082–83 (“Litigants
have asserted public nuisance claims successfully in response to various environmental
problems, including dust, smoke, noise, odors, and hazardous chemical releases. At the root
of these varying factual circumstances is the notion of public harm: the public nuisance
doctrine addresses general harm resulting from the conduct of others. Recent litigation
seeking to apply public nuisance to lead paint, handgun violence, and climate change
underscores the malleability of the doctrine.”). Whereas nuisance law imposes a kind of faultbased liability, requiring a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and
enjoyment of neighboring land or with public rights, trespass law protects against more
tangible unpermitted physical invasions, supplying a kind of strict liability remedy. See infra
Section I.G and accompanying text (discussing the blending of nuisance and trespass law in
Martin v. Reynolds Metals).
53.
The antidevelopmental origins of nuisance law, however, ran headlong into
the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Over time, many
courts interpreted nuisance law to evolve from a rigid, antidevelopmental doctrine reflected
in the St. Helens Tipping decision that threatened emerging industries into a more flexible
rule that weighed the advantages of the new developments. See generally HORWITZ, supra
note 22, at 74–78; Kurtz, supra note 23, at 670; Lewin, supra note 23, at 781. An early
example was the 1839 decision of Lexington & Ohio Rail Road Co. v. Applegate, 38 Ky. (8
Dana) 289, 306 (Ky. 1839), involving trains running through downtown Louisville, which
produced loud noise and steam. The Kentucky Supreme Court, invoking reasonable use and
utilitarian balancing, explained that “[t]he law is made for the times, and will be made or
modified by them. The expanded and still expanding genius of the common law should adapt
it here, as elsewhere, to the improved and improving conditions of our country.” This court
clearly would not allow old antidevelopmental interpretations of nuisance law to hamper
industrial growth, a harbinger of the future. Professor Horwitz considered this decision to be
one of the few pre-Civil War cases to openly admit the need to “adapt the law of nuisance to
the demands of economic development,” contrasting the rigidity of nuisance to other
doctrines more amenable to change, as the law of nuisance long continued to reflect the
deepest eighteenth-century notions of the absolute prerogatives of private property. “The
abundance of undeveloped land was surely a major factor in postponing the profoundly
antidevelopmental effect of the law of nuisance on the course of industrialization.” HORWITZ,
supra note 22, at 75.
To the same effect as the Kentucky decision was Versailles Borough v.
McKeesport Coal & Coke, 83 PITTSBURGH LEGAL J. 379 (1935), where Judge Michael
Mussmano of Pennsylvania’s Allegheny County Court colorfully decided that coal jobs
would not be sacrificed for air quality, declaring that there was “not enough smoke in
Pittsburgh,” for smoke represented “the fires of prosperity;” he consequently rejected
nuisance claims concerning air pollution and flaming “gob piles” because “we cannot give
Mediterranean skies to the plaintiffs, when by doing so, we may send the worker and breadwinners of the community involved to the Black Sea of destitution.”
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slopes of the Sierra Nevada Mountains in pursuit of gold, discharging massive
amounts of sediment into the Yuba River, tributary to the Feather and Sacramento
Rivers, damaging both navigation and water quality and flooding towns.54 Residents
from central California towns, joined by the state, sought to enjoin the mining
companies’ blasting, claiming an unreasonable interference with the public’s right
to navigate on the river and the private use and enjoyment of affected adjacent
properties.55
The reviewing federal court agreed with the plaintiffs, concluding that the
mining practices constituted both a private and a public nuisance due to, among
other things, the “fouling” of the river, making it “unfit for ordinary domestic
purposes.”56 The court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the companies
held mining rights under federal law because the court concluded that federal
authorization did not extend to mining practices that injured neighboring lands.57
The court noted that the California Supreme Court had never ruled that local mining
customs permitted injury to other lands, and in fact the state court had held a number
of times that miners could not use their properties in a manner that “injure[d]

54.
Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 756 (C.C.D.
Cal. 1884).
55.
The landowners claimed that the mining operations caused river overflows,
often covering the riverbanks on their lands with water and debris. For example, the town of
Marysville, located at the confluence of the Yuba and Feather Rivers, suffered years of
devastating flooding. The people of the town started building levees in 1868 and found they
had to increase the height each year to keep up with the increased mining discharges. The
levees were no match for the debris, however, and in 1875 Marysville experienced its first
major flood. The court declared that “[t]his was doubtless owing in great part to the filling up
of the channels and elevation of the beds of the rivers . . . .” Id. at 765.
56.
Id. at 809. The court also cited impairment to navigation, injury to agricultural
lands, and flooding of nearby towns. Id. at 809–10. According to the court, the damage was
considerable:
The lands thus already buried and destroyed are over 15,000 acres, or 25
square miles; or, taking the average width, a tract from the foot-hills to
Marysville, twelve miles long along the river by two miles wide. The
filling in the river bed is generally 25 feet or more, and, at its immediate
junction with Feather River at Marysville, is about 20 feet deep,—some
witnesses make it deeper,—where it forms a bar of nearly that depth across
Feather River. The depth of the filling is increasing year by year, and
raising the bed of the river within the levees higher and higher above the
surrounding country outside the levees.
Id. at 761.
57.
Id. at 773, 802. The mining rights were federally recognized under the 1872
Mining Act, which required compliance with state law. See 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1971); Dodge v.
Wilkinson, 664 P.2d 157, 160 (Alaska 1983) (“State law is applicable to location of mining
claims and claim disputes involving public land only to extent that state law is not inconsistent
with federal law.”). Recently, both the California Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have
upheld state bans on suction dredge mining in rivers despite the miners’ federal mining rights.
Bohmker v. Oregon, 903 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir. 2018); People v. Rinehart, 377 P.3d 818 (Cal.
2016).
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another.”58 The federal court emphasized that the mining continuously imperiled
nearby lands59 and discounted the public value of the mining, since it was “merely
for the convenience of another . . . in pursuit of his or their private business,” which
did not outweigh the damage inflicted, and which justified injunctive relief.60
Like Aldred and St. Helens Tipping, the balancing the Woodruff court
invoked favored “ordinary domestic purposes.”61 Protection of these traditional uses
58.
Woodruff, 18 F. at 802–03 (citing Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 461 (1878);
Richardson v. Kerr, 34 Cal. 63, 74 (1867); Hill v. Smith, 27 Cal. 476, 482 (1865)) (“‘This
notion (that the rules of the common law as to water rights have been modified in California)
is without substantial foundation. The reasons which constitute the groundwork of the
common law upon this subject remain undisturbed. The conditions to which we are to apply
them are changed, and not the rules themselves. The maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, upon which they are grounded, has lost none of its governing force; on the contrary,
it remains now, and in the mining regions of this state, as operative a test of the lawful use of
waters as at any time in the past, or in any other country.’ And in Richardson v. Kier, 34 Cal.
at 74, the court said: ‘He is bound to so use his ditch as not to injure his neighbor’s land,
irrespective of the question as to which has the older right or title, * * * and if, through any
fault or neglect of his in not properly managing and keeping in repair, the water does overflow
or break through the banks of the ditch and injure the lands of others, either by washing away
the soil or covering the soil with sand, the law holds him responsible;’ and these are but
examples of many others too numerous to mention, and too familiar in this state to require
citation. The Supreme Court of the United States recognizes the principle of the maxim also
in Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. at 461. Said the Court: ‘The position of the testator’s ditch
prevented this working, and thus deprived him of this value of the water and practically
destroyed his mining claim. No system of law with which we are acquainted tolerates the use
of one’s property in this way so as to destroy the property of another.’”).
59.
Following the court’s ruling, the mining companies continued to pollute,
causing Woodruff to bring contempt actions in 1886 and in 1891. Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield
Gravel Mining Co., 27 F. 795, 797 (C.C.D. Cal. 1886) (holding that wastewater discharges
resulting from a mine tunneling project violated an injunction restraining defendants from
discharging refuse matter into the Yuba River). See generally Kaitlin N. Vigars, Buried
Beneath the Legislation It Gave Rise To: The Significance of Woodruff v. North Bloomfield
Gravel Mining Co., 43 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 235 (2016).
60.
Woodruff, 18 F. at 812. The court also rejected the mining company’s claim
that it held a prescriptive right to continue its operations, ruling that prescription cannot
legitimize a public nuisance, and recognized that members of the public could enforce a public
nuisance if they suffered “peculiar injury.” Id. at 787–88. On the Restatement’s endorsement
of the special injury requirement, see supra note 13.
61.
Woodruff, 18 F. at 809. Perhaps not coincidentally, protection of domestic uses
is the highest priority of both Western and Eastern water law. See 1 WATER AND WATER
RIGHTS, §§ 2.05(a), (c), 9.03(a)(3), 15.02(b) (Amy K. Kelley ed., 3d ed. 2009).
Professor Fraley has maintained that the so-called balancing employed in
traditional nuisance doctrine cases actually imposed strict liability, in the form of an absolute
right to damages whenever sufficient injury was shown. Jill Fraley, The Uncompensated
Takings of Nuisance Law, 62 VILL. L. REV. 651, 656 (2017) (quoting Madison v. Ducktown
Sulpher, Copper & Iron, 83 S.W. 658, 664 (Tenn. 1904)) (“A judgment for damages in this
class of cases is matter of absolute right, where injury is shown . . . ”). She also noted the
1942 version of American Jurisprudence stated that in deciding whether a use was a nuisance,
“it is of no consequence that the business is a useful or necessary one, or that it contributes to
the wealth and prosperity of the community.” Fraley, supra, at 656 (quoting 39 AM. JUR.
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also revealed the potential of public nuisance to improve environmental quality, in
this case, water quality. By protecting the public’s right to navigate in the Yuba
Basin, the injunction stopped mining operations producing widespread sediment
pollution damage to the affected waterways.62
D. Missouri v. Illinois
In 1900, the State of Missouri filed an original jurisdiction suit in the
Supreme Court against the State of Illinois in what became the Supreme Court’s first
interstate pollution case, charging that the City of Chicago’s discharge of sewage
into the Desplaines River, a tributary of the Mississippi River, was a public
nuisance.63 Chicago had reversed the course of the Chicago River so that it would
no longer pollute Lake Michigan but instead would eventually flow into the
Desplaines River and ultimately into the Mississippi River, less than 50 miles
upriver from St. Louis.64 Missouri claimed that the reversed flow poisoned the river,
NUISANCES § 45, at 327 (1942)). Fraley explained that until the mid-twentieth century
“reasonableness” was not actually balancing the gravity of the plaintiff’s harm versus the
utility of the defendant’s conduct (as later adopted by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 821B) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)), but instead amounted to exceptions from strict liability for
1) injunctions; as opposed to damages; 2) preliminary injunctions, as opposed to permanent
injunctions; 3) public necessity involving “the basic sustaining industry of the community;”
4) de minimis injuries; and 5) laches. Fraley, supra, at 661–69 (supplying considerable
documentation from the case law).
62.
Another case to the same effect as Woodruff in the same year was the
California Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152,
1153 (Cal. 1884) (affirming an injunction against hydraulic gold mining pollution in the
Sacramento River, with “between four and five thousand cubic yards of solid material from
its said mine, to-wit, of bowlders, cobbles, gravel, and sand, making a yearly discharge of at
least six hundred thousand cubic yards . . . .”). The state court’s reasoning in Gold Run Ditch
was similar to that of the federal court in Woodruff: the State had a duty to protect the public,
and that a right to continue a public nuisance could not be acquired by prescription or
legalized by a lapse in time. Id. at 1159.
The blasting operations associated with Gold Rush-era mining produced
adverse environmental effects similar to those of mountaintop mining operations of the
twenty-first century. On mountaintop mining, see What is Mountaintop Mining?,
https://earthjustice.org/features/campaigns/what-is-mountaintop-removalEARTHJUSTICE,
mining (last visited Apr. 9, 2019) (“Coal companies first raze an entire mountainside, ripping
trees from the ground and clearing brush with huge tractors. This debris is then set ablaze as
deep holes are dug for explosives. An explosive is poured into these holes and mountaintops
are literally blown apart. Huge machines called draglines—some the size of an entire city
block, able to scoop up to 100 tons in a single load—push rock and dirt into nearby streams
and valleys, forever burying waterways. Coal companies use explosives to blast as much as
800 to 1,000 feet off the tops of mountains in order to reach thin coal seams buried deep
below.”).
63.
See Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri II), 200 U.S. 496, 497 (1906).
64.
The American Society of Civil Engineers still lauds the project as a “Claim to
Fame” on its website, explaining that it was “[c]ompleted in 1900, the reversal of the Chicago
River [was] a major civil engineering innovation, requir[ing] imaginative planning and
ingenious construction. The result was a multi-purpose project that significantly benefited the
development of America’s heartland.” Reversal of the Chicago River, AM. SOC’Y CIV.
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allegedly causing a rise in typhoid fever in St. Louis, and sought an injunction.65
Illinois claimed that the Court should dismiss the suit because Missouri lacked both
affected property rights and standing to represent the small number of affected
landowners in the state along the Mississippi River, but the Court refused to dismiss
the case in 1901.66
After a special master heard from 350 witnesses, amassed over 1,000
exhibits, and compiled a record in excess of 13,000 pages, a 1906 opinion by Justice
Holmes for a unanimous Court rejected the nuisance claim on causation grounds.67
Holmes cited conflicting expert witness testimony about the effect of the discharged
sewage over 350 miles downstream, observing that no case had ever held “so remote
a source” liable for infection and disease discovered so far away.68 According to
Holmes, the claim of nuisance was problematic because it was not of “the simple
kind,” was undetectable “by the unassisted senses,” and produced “no visible
increase of filth, no new smell;” thus, in order to prevail against this “inference of
the unseen,” Missouri would have to marshal the “most ingenious experiments
and . . . interpretation [of] the most subtle speculations, of modern science.”69
Missouri claimed a 77% increase in typhoid deaths since the river’s
reversal, but the Court noted that the State failed to show that typhoid bacteria could
survive in the river long enough to reach St. Louis.70 Holmes also emphasized that
Illinois’ experts claimed that the poor quality of Missouri’s water was due to sewage
discharge practices in that state as well.71 Although the Court’s opinion cited the
ENGINEERS, https://www.asce.org/project/reversal-of-the-chicago-river/ (last visited Apr. 2,
2019). Elihu Root, the Secretary of War with jurisdiction over navigation through supervision
of the Army Corps of Engineers, apparently agreed, as he refused to stop the project absent a
showing of adverse effects on navigation or public health. See Robert V. Percival, The
Frictions of Federalism: The Rise and Fall of the Federal Common Law of Interstate
Nuisance 6 (Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper No. 2003-02, 2003),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=452922.
65.
Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 523.
66.
See Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri I), 180 U.S. 208, 217–18, 249 (1901)
(opinion by Justice Shiras, rejecting Illinois’ demurrer). According to a recent analysis, the
case was the first in which the Supreme Court recognized that a state’s sovereign interest
could become a judicially cognizable claim. Comment, The Sovereign Self-Preservation
Doctrine in Environmental Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 621, 622 (2019). However, the Court
refused Missouri’s claim for a preliminary injunction and signaled that the State would face
a high bar on the merits, showing “a real and immediate danger” by “determinate and
satisfactory” evidence. Missouri I, 180 U S. at 248.
67.
Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 526.
68.
Id. at 523.
69.
Id. at 518–22.
70.
Id. at 523.
71.
Id. at 525–26. A similar result occurred in New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S.
296, 309 (1921), in which New York sought to enjoin a New Jersey sewage disposal project
that would discharge into New York Bay. Citing the high burden of proof established in
Missouri II, which the Court equated to a standard of “clear and convincing” proof, a
unanimous Court determined that New York failed to present sufficient evidence to warrant
an injunction. Id. The Court relied on the fact that the New Jersey project was designed with
“the best obtainable sanitary engineers, chemists, and bacteriologists,” and observed that, like
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lack of scientific connection between the increased sewage and typhoid deaths, the
decision was also likely influenced by Illinois’ claims that Chicago spent over $40
million on the project, while Missouri took no legal action during its seven years of
construction, suggesting that it was guilty of laches.72
Missouri v. Illinois thus ratified large-scale environmental disruption and
legitimized Chicago’s brazen engineering feat. The Court did infer that more
evidence of causation might yield a different result, however, and that nuisance law
could evolve in response to scientific advances.73 Notably, in 1907, only a year after
the Supreme Court’s decision, expert testimony to Congress saw a clear link
between increased typhoid in St. Louis and the sewage the reversed river sent in its
direction. 74 And, ironically, Missouri would later join Illinois in arguing for
maintenance of the reversed river flows against other states worried about declining
Great Lakes water levels.75

Missouri in the Chicago River case, New York had unclean hands, as New York City and
other New York municipalities discharged untreated sewage into the bay. Id. at 301, 309–10;
see Percival, supra note 64, at 42–44.
A decade later, New Jersey successfully invoked Supreme Court original
jurisdiction to enjoin New York City’s ocean dumping of sewage sludge and garbage. New
Jersey v. City of New York City, 283 U.S. 473 (1931). The Court’s unanimous decision
described the garbage that washed up on the beaches as “unsightly and noxious, constitut[ing]
a means to public health and tend[ing] to reduce property values . . . . Floating garbage makes
bathing impracticable, frequently tears and damages fish pound nets and injuriously affect the
business of fishing.” Id. at 478. Eventually, the Court ordered the City to stop the ocean
dumping by 1934 and awarded New Jersey damages to compensate for the costs of beach
cleanups required after the City missed an earlier 1933 deadline. New Jersey v. City of New
York, 290 U.S. 237, 239–40 (1933). See also Percival, supra note 64, at 48–50.
72.
See Perceival, supra note 64, at 9.
73.
Holmes’ mention of “the most ingenious experiments” required that the
threatened damage be “of a serious magnitude” and be “clearly and fully proved” but implied
that better evidence from Missouri could have led the Court to a different result. Missouri II,
200 U.S. at 518, 521. Holmes observed that had the case been brought a half century earlier,
“it almost necessarily would have failed,” but even accepting “the now prevailing scientific
explanation of typhoid fever;” he thought there was insufficient proof that typhoid bacteria
could survive the 25-day journey to St. Louis. Id. at 522–23.
74.
See Hearing on Pollution of Rivers by Chicago Sewage, U.S. House of Rep.,
59th Cong. 2d Sess. 106, 108 (1907) (testimony of William Thompson Sedgwick, professor
at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, concluding that the reversed river “undoubtedly
ha[d] the effect of increasing typhoid fever in St. Louis); see also id. at 117 (“I believe that
beyond all reasonable doubt the principal factor of the annual increase of typhoid-fever
mortality of the city of St. Louis since January 1, 1900, has been due to the pollution of the
water supply of the city of St. Louis by the unpurified sewage of the sanitary district of
Chicago.”).
75.
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 399 (1929) (affirming a special master’s
recommendation that called for a series of cutbacks in Chicago’s diversions of Lake Michigan
water). In addition to Missouri, Illinois was supported by other Lower Mississippi Basin
states, including Kentucky, Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Louisiana against
Wisconsin, Michigan, and New York, which objected to Chicago’s increased diversions. Id.
at 399–401. The case dragged on for years, prompting several Court opinions, eventually
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E. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.
Just a year after the Court’s decision in Missouri v. Illinois, the Supreme
Court reached an apparently contrary conclusion in another interstate nuisance case,
due largely to the Court’s emphasis on the role of the state as a sovereign plaintiff.
In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., the Court reaffirmed some of the reasoning of
Missouri v. Illinois, explaining that caution was necessary when a state seeks “relief
from injuries analogous to torts.”76 However, in another opinion by Justice Holmes,
the Court decided that unlike Missouri, Georgia had alleged facts warranting
injunctive relief. 77 Georgia challenged the operations of two Tennessee copper
companies, whose use of open-pit roasting discharged noxious gases that migrated
into Georgia, producing ongoing and “wholesale destruction of forests, orchards,
and crops,” and imminently threatening more irreparable harm in the state.78 This
air pollution damage to Georgia’s trees and vegetation, reminiscent of the pollution
in St. Helens Smelting,79 was apparently clearer to the Court than the health effects
due to water pollution in St. Louis.
Justice Holmes once again wrote for the Court, and he placed considerable
weight on the special sovereign status of Georgia.80 He declared that:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a sovereign that the
air over its territory should not be polluted on a great scale by
sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its mountains . . . should not
be further destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its
ordering Illinois to “take all necessary steps” to fund sewage treatment that would enable
reduced diversions. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395, 406 (1933); see Percival, supra note
64, at 13–15.
Today, due in part to climate change induced high precipitation levels, Great
Lakes water levels are surging to record levels. See John Flesher, Great Lakes Water Levels
Surge, Some Record Highs Predicted, AP NEWS (May 7, 2019), https://www.apnews.com/
2af073fe3a634f68b80bdfb419e53a33 (citing a Corps of Engineers’ study that predicted
record water levels in 2019 for Lakes Superior and Erie and near-record levels for the other
Great Lakes, continuing a five-year trend, and raising concerns about flooding and erosion).
76.
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
77.
Id. at 236–39. Georgia filed suit in 1903 but initially settled the case in 1904
when the copper companies agreed to change management practices, eliminating so-called
roast piles that produced enormous amounts of smoke and sulfur emissions and increasing
the height of their smokestacks. Id. at 239. When the damage to Georgia lands continued, as
documented in a federal Forestry Bureau report, which found that the new taller smokestacks
merely spread the pollution over a broader area, the State returned to court in 1905. See
Percival, supra note 64, at 21–22.
78.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 236. The Court’s opinion followed a
special master’s report which included 1,500 witnesses and 2,000 affidavits on the nature of
the harm caused by air pollution. Percival, supra note 64, at 24.
79.
See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text.
80.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237 (“The case has been argued largely as
if it were one between two private parties; but it is not . . . . This is a suit by a state for an
injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the State has an interest
independent of and behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.
It has the last word as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.”). The decision thus adumbrated the Court’s decision a
century later in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). See infra note 87.
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control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be
endangered from the same source.81

Despite the company’s efforts to curb the noxious discharges, a unanimous
Court issued an injunction.82 Justice Holmes pointed out that the copper companies
attempted to stop the trouble they caused by abandoning old methods of roasting ore
in open heaps and building tall chimneys for the gases instead.83 Unfortunately, the
new tall stacks caused the poisonous gases to travel even greater distances than
before and spread air pollution deeper into Georgia. 84 The Court consequently
decided that Georgia had waited a reasonable time for the company to remedy the
injuries.85 So to stop the fumes, which continued to cause a nuisance to Georgia
land, the Court granted the State an injunction.86
The Court’s willingness to grant Georgia injunctive relief contrasted with
its reluctance to grant Missouri’s public nuisance claim the year before. Holmes was
clearly influenced by the State of Georgia’s sovereign status. This deference to state
sovereignty would prove determinative a century later when the Court upheld the
State of Massachusetts’ standing to challenge the Environmental Protection
Agency’s failure to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.87 The 1907
decision was hardly the end of the matter, however, as the Court’s decision left the
81.
Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238.
82.
Id. at 239.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. The situation resembled the “tall stacks” approach to air pollution once
endorsed by the federal Clean Air Act. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11473, AIR QUALITY: INFORMATION ON TALL SMOKESTACKS AND THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO
INTERSTATE TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTION (2011) (explaining that the original Clean Air Act
encouraged power plants to install tall stacks in the early 1970s, but the 1977 amendments
discouraged use of dispersion techniques like tall stacks). See Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v.
Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that EPA’s attempt to establish a
“plume impaction credit” for tall stacks on mountainsides was not consistent with the Clean
Air Act).
85.
The State had waited about two years, as Georgia originally filed a suit in the
Supreme Court in 1904, but agreed to dismiss it that year because Tennessee Copper
abandoned its old open heap ore burning and began building the tall stacks. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U.S. at 239.
86.
Id.
87.
The Supreme Court’s Massachusetts v. EPA decision quoted from Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co.:
The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two private
parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be relied upon in a suit
between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are wanting here.
The State owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and the
damage to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small. This
is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In
that capacity the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles
of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word
as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–19 (2007), quoting Tennessee Copper Co., 206
U.S. at 237.
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State with the option of not enforcing the injunction if the companies curbed their
emissions. One of the companies, Ducktown Copper, failed to do so and was
eventually enjoined by the Court in 1915.88 The other, Tennessee Copper, agreed to
a victims’ compensation fund that for three years paid damages to affected
landowners,89 an innovative remedy that signaled a middle ground between
injunctive relief and no relief.
F. Columbia River Fishermen’s Protective Union v. City of St. Helens
Another river pollution case illustrated that courts could uphold the ability
of private parties to maintain a public nuisance claim if they suffered a clear and
distinct injury materially different than that of the general public. In 1938, Oregon
commercial fishermen filed suit against the City of St. Helens, a board
manufacturing plant, and a pulp mill over their discharges of pollutants into the
Columbia and Willamette rivers.90 The fishermen alleged the City’s waste system
and the plant operations deposited large quantities of chemicals directly into the
rivers, including “sulphate and sulphite, sewage and waste products and waste
matter such as minute fibers of pulp” that killed fish and rotted their salmon fishing
nets.91 The fishermen argued they suffered significant injury due to the defendants’
pollution, which inflicted damage on them that was different from that visited upon
the public because the poor water quality destroyed their livelihoods.92 The lower
court sustained the defendants’ demurrer, however, ruling the harm caused to the
fishermen was no different in kind than the harm felt by the public at large; therefore,
they could not maintain the public nuisance suit.93
The Oregon Supreme Court disagreed and granted the fishermen standing
to seek relief against the polluters.94 The court distinguished the fishermen’s injury
from that of the public as a whole, finding “a vital distinction between the rights of
plaintiffs, who are accustomed to fishing in the river and have a license so to do, and
the rights of other citizens of the state, who never fish in the river and do not intend
to.”95 The court’s opinion expressed concern over the potential destruction of the
salmon industry, referring to the commercial fishing rights the plaintiffs sought to

88.
Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474, 477–78 (1915).
89.
See Percival, supra note 64, at 30 (discussing the fund which the company
established that paid $16,500 a year for three years). During World War I, the State of Georgia
relaxed emission controls to aid the war effort, and later the state legislature extended the
relaxation twice, in 1922 and 1925. The case was finally closed in 1938 when Tennessee
Copper agreed to pay over 20 years of the State’s attorney fees. Id. at 38–39.
90.
Columbia River Fishermen’s Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 87 P.2d
195, 196 (Or. 1939).
91.
Id. at 196–97.
92.
Id. at 197.
93.
Id. (“It is stated in the plaintiffs’ brief that the lower court sustained the
demurrer on the grounds that the complaint shows these plaintiffs have suffered no special
and peculiar injury differing in kind from that suffered by the public, and therefore they
cannot maintain this suit.”).
94.
Id. at 199.
95.
Id. at 197.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3408549

422

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62:403

protect as “of the greatest moment,” and stressing that the defendants’ inflicted harm
on that right was not trivial.96
The special injury inquiry continues to be a central issue in public nuisance
litigation, however, special injury is usually used as a defense by private defendants.
A recent example from 2018 was the Arizona Supreme Court’s denial of relief to
the Hopi Tribe after it filed a nuisance suit against the City of Flagstaff and a private
ski resort for using wastewater to create artificial snow on the San Francisco Peaks,
a sacred site for the Hopi for millennia.97 The Tribe alleged that it would suffer
special injury because the “[n]atural resources that the Hopi collect, as well as
shrines, sacred areas, and springs on the Peaks will come into contact with the blown
reclaimed wastewater,” which would gravely disturb the Tribe’s use of the area for
spiritual and religious ceremonies. 98 The Tribe sought injunctive relief from the
wastewater-snow operation or, in the alternative, damages.99 The trial court granted
the resort’s motion to dismiss, and the Tribe appealed.100 The state court of appeals
reversed, deciding that the Tribe had shown a special injury adequate to proceed to
summary judgment because, even though the harm concerned public land, that land
held special importance to tribal members.101 But the state supreme court did not
agree, declaring “as a matter of law, that environmental damage to public land with
religious, cultural, or emotional significance to the plaintiff is not special injury for
public nuisance purposes.”102 Consequently, the court denied both injunctive relief
and damages, reasoning the Tribe lacked a property interest and deciding that tribal
members’ more frequent use of the area was not different in kind from the interest
of the general public sufficient to create special injury.103 The special injury
requirement continues to make it difficult for private parties to maintain successful
public nuisance claims.104
96.
Id. at 199. In Union Oil v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974), the court ruled
that oil companies had a duty to commercial fishermen to conduct their offshore drilling and
production in a reasonably prudent manner to avoid negligent damage to fisheries.
97.
Hopi Tribe v. Ariz. Snowbowl Resort Ltd. P’ship, 430 P.3d 362, 364 (Ariz.
2018).
98.
Id.
99.
Id. at 371.
100.
Id. at 364.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
Id. at 369–71.
104.
See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 368 (2d Cir.
2009) (holding that the special injury requirement was met by nonprofit land trusts whose
land would be significantly harmed, beyond the harm done to the general public, recognizing
that “a line must be drawn between the many who suffer from a public nuisance and those
who may properly bring an action”); New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 335 F. Supp. 2d 1185,
1239 (D.N.M. 2004) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C (AM. LAW INST.
1939)) (ruling that the equitable relief is limited without proof of a discrete, “special injury,”
which requires a showing of “particular harm, over and above that caused to the public at
large or to other members of the public exercising the same public right,” including physical
harm and pecuniary loss of a different kind of harm from that suffered by the general public,”
possibly resulting from the pollution of public waters); Johnson v. Bryco Arms, 304 F. Supp.
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G. Martin v. Reynolds Metals
Unlike nuisance, trespass law protects against tangible unpermitted
physical invasions, supplying a kind of strict liability remedy, whereas
contemporary nuisance now requires fault in the form of a finding of unreasonable
interference.105 And unlike nuisance, which affords defendants the defense of the
reasonableness of their actions, balancing is unavailable to trespass defendants.
Thus, trespass, which also usually offers a longer statute of limitations, is much more
attractive to plaintiffs, so if a polluting activity can be characterized as a trespass,
plaintiffs will seek to do so.
The pioneering case blending trespass and nuisance liability was Martin v.
Reynolds Metals, a decision by the Oregon Supreme Court concerning fluoride
emissions from an aluminum plant in suburban Portland, Oregon.106 Paul Martin, an
orchard and livestock owner, alleged that the fluoride gas pollution from a nearby
aluminum plant damaged his livestock and his farm, even though it was invisible
and odorless.107 Reynolds defended on the ground that invisible, odorless
particulates were insufficient to incur liability.108
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed a trial court’s judgment for the
landowner, ruling that the fluoride emissions were a trespassory invasion, similar to
other small invasions like those caused by gun discharges.109 The decision suggested
that advances in science should precipitate changes in legal doctrine, memorably
stating that “E=mc2 has taught us that mass and energy are equivalents and that our
concept of ‘things’ must be reframed,” and that advances in science should affect
the scope of trespass law.110 The Oregon court’s decision recalled the Holmesian
2d 383, 392 (D.N.Y. 2004) (the existence of individualized special injury is the deciding
factor in determining whether compensation is available, stating that “[w]hen the injury
claimed to be peculiar is of the same kind suffered by all who are affected, when it is common
to the entire community, or . . . becomes so general and widespread as to affect a whole
community, the injury is not peculiar and the action cannot be maintained”).
105.
Professor Fraley has shown that the reasonableness balancing as part of the
prima facie case of nuisance was an outgrowth of the first Restatement’s definition of
reasonableness and its influence on courts in the 1950s and 1960s, in effect requiring
balancing both as to whether there was in fact a nuisance, and then whether injunctive relief
was appropriate. See Fraley, supra note 61, at 671–77 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS
223–24 (AM. LAW INST. 1939) and ensuing case law). Prosser’s treatise also contributed in
expanding the role of reasonableness to balance the gravity of the harm sustained by plaintiffs
against the utility of the defendants’ conduct. See id. at 672–73 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 72 at 405 (2d ed. 1955)).
106.
342 P.2d 790 (Or. 1959). The story of air pollution from aluminum plants in
the Northwest, which included a number of cases, is told by WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
CORPORATE COUNTRY: A STATE SHAPED TO SUIT TECHNOLOGY (1973).
107.
Martin, 342 P.2d at 790–91.
108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 792, 794 (citing Munro v. Williams, 109 A. 129 (Conn. 1920) (pellets
from an air gun fell onto neighboring land; DiGirolamo v. Philadelphia Gun Club, 89 A.2d
357 (Pa. 1952) (shot from shotguns that fell onto neighboring land)).
110.
Id. at 793–94 (“In fact, the now famous equation E=mc2 has taught us that
mass and energy are equivalents and that our concept of ‘things’ must be reframed. If these
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statement in Missouri v. Illinois that evolving scientific information could result in
shifting standards of liability.111
Several other jurisdictions have followed the Oregon Supreme Court’s
lead, although they often imposed a threshold of significant actual damage that is
not required in typical trespass cases.112 And the Federal District Court of Oregon
soon added an innovative approach to gathering scientific information necessary to
determine available technology to abate fluoride emissions from another aluminum
plant that damaged another nearby orchard.113 According to a recent analysis, the
court empowered the plaintiffs to conduct a worldwide study (at the defendants’
expense) of best available technologies to reduce fluorine emissions, 114 in many
respects foreshadowing the approach of the federal pollution statutes, which
imposed controls on industrial polluters based on best available technology.115

observations on science in relation to the law of trespass should appear theoretical and unreal
in the abstract, they become very practical and real to the possessor of land when the unseen
force cracks the foundation of his house. The force is just as real if it is chemical in nature
and must be awakened by the intervention of another agency before it does harm.”).
111.
See supra notes 69, 73 and accompanying text.
112.
See, e.g., Rushing v. Hooper-McDonald, Inc., 300 So. 2d 94, 97 (Ala. 1974)
(“This court holds that it is not necessary that the asphalt or foreign matter be thrown or
dumped directly and immediately upon the plaintiff’s land but that it is sufficient if the act is
done so that it will to a substantial certainty result in the entry of the asphalt or foreign matter
onto the real property that the plaintiff possesses.”); McDowell v. State, 957 P.2d 965, 969
(Alaska 1998) (agreeing with other jurisdictions that “negligent contamination of real
property is an injury to land in the nature of trespass”); Elton v. Annheuser-Busch, 50 Cal.
App. 4th 1301, 1306 (1996) (“a trespassory invasion may take the form of . . . invisible
particulates of fluorine compounds”); Md. Heights Leasing, Inc. v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 706
S.W.2d 218, 226 (Mo. 1985) (“[W]e conclude that radioactive emissions may constitute
trespass. The ‘physical invasion’ alleged by appellants, broadly construed, permits the
inference that radioactive material has been deposited on appellants’ property.”); Sciscoe v.
Enbridge Gathering (North Texas), L.P., 519 S.W.3d 171, 185 (Tex. App. 2015) (“[A]
trespass claim under Texas law may be premised upon the entry onto property of airborne
particulates . . . ”). See generally Larry D. Scheafer, Annotation, Recovery in Trespass for
Injury to Land Caused by Airborne Pollutants, 2 A.L.R. 4th 1054 (1980).
113.
Renken v. Harvey Aluminum, 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Or. 1963).
114.
See DOUG KYSAR & CONNOR DWYER REYNOLDS, OF COASE & CHERRIES: RISK
REGULATION AMONG NEIGHBORS IN WASCO COUNTY, OREGON (forthcoming).
115.
See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411(g)(4)(B) (1990) (Revisions are not
available until “as a result of such technology or process, the new source standard of
performance in effect under this section for such category no longer reflects the greatest
degree of emission limitation achievable through application of the best technological system
of continuous emission reduction which (taking into consideration the cost of achieving such
emission reduction, and any non-air quality health and environmental impact and energy
requirements) has been adequately demonstrated.”); see also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(b)(2)(B) (“Factors relating to the assessment of best available technology shall take
into account the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the
engineering aspects of the application of various types of control techniques, process changes,
the cost of achieving such effluent reduction, non-water quality environmental impact
(including energy requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems
appropriate.”) (emphasis added).
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H. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.
In another landmark nuisance case, New York’s highest court considered
the extent to which private litigation should resolve public issues.116 In Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Co., a divided New York Court of Appeals significantly altered the
relief available to the neighboring landowners whose properties were damaged by
the blasting and air pollution from a large, Albany-area cement plant. 117 A jury
found that the plant’s air polluting operations constituted a nuisance because the
plaintiffs suffered substantial damage but denied injunctive relief, instead awarding
temporary damages.118 An appeals court affirmed,119 and landowners appealed to
the New York Court of Appeals.
Boomer has become a celebrated case, featured in many property and
environmental law casebooks, because despite New York’s “long-established rule
of granting an injunction where a nuisance results in substantial continuing
damage,”120 the Court of Appeals agreed with the lower courts that injunctive relief
was inappropriate given the perceived economic disparity between the adverse
effects of the injunction versus the effects of continuing the operation. 121 The
majority justified this departure from the longstanding injunction rule by
emphasizing the large economic investment in the plant, and the fact it employed
more than 300 people.122 Although the neighbors suffered substantial damages, the
court decided that closing the plant was too drastic a remedy123 and, as a result,
awarded the plaintiffs permanent damages, instead of the temporary damages the
trial court awarded.124
Much of the majority’s opinion detailed what it viewed as the limited role
of courts in solving public problems like air pollution. 125 The court therefore
fashioned its relief tailored to the parties before it, rather than attempt what it
described as “a problem presently far from solution.”126 The majority decided that
116.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id. at 872.
120.
See id. at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
121.
Id. at 872.
122.
Id. at 873 n.* (“Respondent’s investment in the plant is in excess of
$45,000,000. There are over 300 people employed there.”).
123.
Id. at 873 (“This result at Special Term [the trial court] and at the Appellate
Division is a departure from a rule that has become settled; but to follow the rule literally in
these cases would be to close down the plant at once. This court is fully agreed to avoid that
immediately drastic remedy; the difference in view is how best to avoid it.”).
124.
Id. at 875.
125.
Id. at 871–73 (“The nuisance complained of by these plaintiffs may have other
public or private consequences, but these particular parties are the only ones who have sought
remedies and the judgment proposed will fully redress them. The limitation of relief granted
is a limitation only within the four corners of these actions and does not foreclose public
health or other public agencies from seeking proper relief in a proper court.”).
126.
Id. at 871 (“Effective control of air pollution is a problem presently far from
solution even with the full public and financial powers of government. In large measure
adequate technical procedures are yet to be developed and some that appear possible may be
economically impracticable.”).
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an injunction against the plant’s continued operation would go “greatly beyond the
rights and interests” before it.127 The court cited the fact that all cement-making
operations produced polluting byproducts, explaining that the rate of research to
eliminate these emissions should not rest solely on the defendant plant’s shoulders
but instead required a nationwide solution.128 The majority’s approach of favoring
damages over injunctive relief was consistent with the Restatement’s near
simultaneous approval of damages as a remedy, even where the utility of a
defendant’s conduct outweighed the gravity of the plaintiff’s harm.129
A dissent saw “grave dangers” in the majority’s decision, which it thought
amounted to “licensing a continuing wrong.” 130 The majority justified granting
permanent damages instead of injunctive relief by citing nuisance cases from other
states, 131 but the dissent thought they were distinguishable because those cases
involved widespread public benefit provided by the nuisances. 132 The dissent
127.
Id. (“A court performs its essential function when it decides the rights of
parties before it. Its decision of private controversies may sometimes greatly affect public
issues. Large questions of law are often resolved by the manner in which private litigation is
decided. But this is normally an incident to the court’s main function to settle controversy. It
is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a decision in private litigation as a purposeful
mechanism to achieve direct public objectives greatly beyond the rights and interests before
the court.”).
128.
Id. at 873 (“Moreover, techniques to eliminate dust and other annoying byproducts of cement making are unlikely to be developed by any research the defendant can
undertake within any short period, but will depend on the total resources of the cement
industry nationwide and throughout the world. The problem is universal wherever cement is
made. For obvious reasons the rate of the research is beyond control of defendant.”).
129.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1979)
(authorizing damages where “the harm caused by the conduct is serious and the financial
burden of compensating for this and similar harm to other would not make the continuation
of the conduct not feasible.”); see Lewin, supra note 23, at 779–85.
130.
Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (“I see grave dangers in
overruling our long-established rule of granting an injunction where a nuisance results in
substantial continuing damage. In permitting the injunction to become inoperative upon the
payment of permanent damages, the majority is, in effect, licensing a continuing wrong. It is
the same as saying to the cement company, you may continue to do harm to your neighbors
so long as you pay a fee for it. Furthermore, once such permanent damages are assessed and
paid, the incentive to alleviate the wrong would be eliminated, thereby continuing air
pollution of an area without abatement.”).
131.
Id. at 874. The court referenced Northern Indiana Public Serv. Co. v. Vesey,
200 N.E. 620 (Ind. 1936), where plaintiff recovered only permanent damages when a northern
Indiana company’s gas plant’s release of gases, odors, ammonia, and smoke damaged its
greenhouse operation; City of Amarillo v. Ware, 40 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. 1931), where the plaintiff
recovered permanent depreciation of property value affected by recurrent sewage overflows;
and Pappenheim v. Metropolitan El. Ry. Co., 28 N.E. 518 (N.Y. 1891), one of several
“elevated railway cases” where the court found that the railways constituted a nuisance to
adjacent landowners, but approved permanent damages in lieu of enjoining the operations.
132.
Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 876. The cases the majority cited, supra note 131,
involved a public service company that provided gas to a large community, a city sewage
system operated for public benefit, and a railway system built and authorized under New York
statute, respectively. The dissent maintained that these cases were not analogous to the
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maintained that Atlantic Cement had created “a continuing air pollution nuisance
primarily for its own private interest,” and the option of paying permanent damages
instead of an injunction amounted to an unlawful use of inverse condemnation.133
The dissent instead recommended avoiding immediately shutting down the
plant by postponing the effects of the injunction for 18 months, thereby giving the
company time to find new technologies to stop the discharge of harmful particles
and abate the nuisance.134 This remedy would have been more responsive to the
urgency of worsening air quality by giving the plant time to reduce its pollution.135
According to the dissent, it was especially important for Atlantic Cement to
implement better dust-control devices because the landowners who sued lived in the
area before the plant; they did not “come to the nuisance,”136 and the majority’s
award of permanent damages eliminated any incentive for the plant to improve its
operations in the future.137
defendant’s plant in Boomer because the plant was operated solely for private, commercial
interest of its owners.
133.
Id. (“This kind of inverse condemnation may not be invoked by a private
person or corporation for private gain or advantage. Inverse condemnation should only be
permitted when the public is primarily served in the taking or impairment of property. The
promotion of the interests of the polluting cement company has, in my opinion, no public use
or benefit.”); Fraley, supra note 61, at 677–80 (examining the effect of nuisance balancing to
work constitutional takings of plaintiffs’ property rights).
134.
Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 877 (Jasen, J., dissenting). Compare the approach in
the Rencken v. Harvey Aluminum case, discussed supra notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
The dissent’s approach soon became a part of statutes like the Clean Air and Water Acts,
which directed the EPA Administrator to study regulated industries to ascertain best available
technology (or some similar standard) that must be included in pollution permits for plants
like the Atlantic Cement plant at issue in Boomer. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (1990)
(requiring new stationary sources of air pollution to meet emission standards reflecting the
“best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost) . . . has been
adequately demonstrated”); 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (2019) (requiring new sources of water
pollution to meet standards reflecting the “greatest degree of effluent reduction . . . achievable
through application of best available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating
methods, or other alternatives, including, where practicable, a standard permitting no
discharge of pollutants”).
135.
Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 877 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (“It is not my intention to
cause the removal of the cement plant from the Albany area, but to recognize the urgency of
the problem stemming from this stationary source of air pollution, and to allow the company
a specified period of time to develop a means to alleviate this nuisance.”).
136.
The dissent emphasized that although this defense is generally available to
defendants in nuisance claims, it was not applicable in Boomer, since plaintiffs lived there
before the plant began operations. Id. (“Moreover, I believe it is incumbent upon the
defendant to develop such devices, since the cement company, at the time the plant
commenced production (1962), was well aware of the plaintiffs’ presence in the area, as well
as the probable consequences of its contemplated operation. Yet, it still chose to build and
operate the plant at this site.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840C (AM. LAW
INST. 1979) (“In an action for a nuisance the plaintiff’s assumption of risk is a defense to the
same extent as in other tort actions.”).
137.
Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 876. Once paying permanent damages, the plant could
relax standards knowing the court foreclosed future litigation on the issue of past damages
from the plaintiffs. Id.
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The Boomer case has prompted numerous comments over the years. 138
Professor Farber thought the opinion’s balancing of the equities analysis was
“cursory,” contrasting the majority’s seemingly quick decision to ignore third-party
interests favorable to the plaintiff (the negative effects of the plant’s air pollution on
the community) with its willingness to emphasize third-party interest favoring the
defendant (the number of people employed at the plant).139 Professor Dobris, on the
other hand, thought the majority got it right, explaining that critics of the case “were
unwilling to face the fact that there has to be tolerance for some pollution as a matter
of resource allocation and economic efficiency. Simply put, we do not drive around
in cars that are exquisitely safe but cost a million dollars.”140

138.
See Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law,
32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 113, 113 (2005) (“Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co. has become an
established part of the legal canon. It looms large, not just in environmental law, but also in
property, remedies, and torts. Its lasting fame is reflected in a law review symposium on the
case some twenty years after the decision.”); see also Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The
Misunderstood Law Of Public Nuisance: A Comparison With Private Nuisance 20 Years After
Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 360 (1990) (“[B]y failing to confine explicitly the application
of its decision to private nuisance, the Boomer court may have further befogged the law”);
Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts, and Markets In The New York Court Of Appeals, 18501915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 302 (1990) (“[The Boomer court] assumed the power to resolve
conflicts among competing land uses, fashioning a remedy that allowed courts to impose
liability to remedy injuries to and from property, which simultaneously retaining the language
of property rules in order to address the causation of those injuries”); Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer
and The American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 221
(1990) (“[T]he prominence of the Boomer decision . . . reflects its paradigmatic quality as a
contemporary illustration of the dilemma faced by the courts in modern land use
conflicts . . . discussing the various elements that a court might consider in determining both
the entitlements and the appropriate remedy in a nuisance dispute between a major industrial
polluter and residential plaintiffs”); Joel C. Dobris, Symposium on Nuisance Law: Twenty
Years after Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 54 ALB. L. REV. 171 (1990) (containing Joel C.
Dobris, Boomer 20 Years Later: An Introduction with Some Footnotes About “Theory,” 54
ALB. L. REV. 171, 173 (1990) (characterizing the Boomer case is a “paradigm for the modern
land use dilemma”).
139.
Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 873–74. Professor Farber noted that “[t]he damage
award was not generous. The trial judge awarded the plaintiffs a total of $535 per month in
damages for past losses, but suggested that the parties settle the case for the amount of the
permanent loss of market value, which he calculated as $185,000 for all the plaintiffs
combined.” Farber, supra note 138, at 120.
140.
Dobris, supra note 138, at 184. Boomer was greeted with enthusiasm among
many legal scholars, especially those advancing a law and economics perspective. See, e.g.,
Ezra M. Holczer, Boomer Revisited: Using Experimental and Partial Injunctions in Private
Nuisance Actions, 64 DEF. COUNSEL J. 99 (1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damages Remedies, 32 STAN. L. REV.
1075, 1077 (1980); Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63
VA. L. REV. 1299, 1300 n.4 (1977); see also RICHARD B. STEWART & JAMES E. KRIER,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 243–44 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing the debate between
limiting relief to damages versus adopting various forms of injunctive relief).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3408549

2020] A DOZEN LANDMARK NUISANCE CASES

429

Dobris also maintained, consistent with the majority, that nuisance is not a
fit vehicle to resolve pollution issues.141 Boomer’s popularity in the literature may
be due to the circumscribed role it prescribed for judicial injunctions, or for its
acceptance of permanent damages as a remedy preferred over temporary damages.
But the result did nothing to improve the environment damaged by the cement
plant’s emissions, and the award of permanent damages meant that the plant had no
incentive to reduce emissions or vibrations.142
I. Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc.
Although hazardous waste liability now has become largely a matter of
federal statutory law, 143 nuisance doctrine has played a role in hazardous waste
cases. A leading case was Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, in which an Illinois
town, the county, a group of citizens, and the federal government144 charged that a
landfill filled with hazardous waste amounted to a public nuisance due to dust, odors,
and air and water pollution. 145 SCA defended on the ground that any judicial
declaration of a public nuisance would amount to a “sudden change” in state law,
depriving the company of its property without due process.146 The company cited to
the fact that it had permits from the state environmental agency,147 and state officials
testified that the site did not present a hazard from an engineering or geological
perspective.148 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, alleged that impending subsidence
would soon release harmful chemicals, and therefore should be enjoined as

141.
Dobris based his opinion on “notions of civil procedure and the inherent
limitations of the nuisance cause of action.” He claimed that “civil proceduralists are split” as
to whether a judge should decide only the narrow questions before the court or “actively reach
out.” Dobris, supra note 138, at 185. In Dobris’s opinion, the majority’s opinion resulted in a
middle ground between the “modern flexibility” of remedy and the dated notion of the judge
as a “passive observer and referee.” Id. at 185. A court that did not share the Boomer court’s
limited view of judicial responsibility was Rencken v. Harvey Aluminum, discussed supra
notes 113–14 and accompanying text.
142.
The same year of the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in Boomer,
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act, which potentially subjected the Atlantic Cement plant
to regulation. However, the statute was focused mostly on new emissions of pollutants, which
were subject to federal control under section 111 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7411. Existing plants
were subject to more indirect regulation, through state implementation plans authorized by
section 110 of the statute, id. § 7410, not through federal emission controls.
143.
See generally CRAIG N. JOHNSTON ET AL., LEGAL PROTECTION OF THE
ENVIRONMENT ch. 5, § I.B (4th ed. 2018).
144.
See Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 396 N.E.2d 552, 554 (Ill. App.
1979) (discussing the various plaintiffs in the case).
145.
See id. at 557.
146.
The state’s supreme sourt rejected this claim, stating that:
the principles of law applied in this case are neither new, unreasonable,
nor unpredictable. Manifestly, a party cannot expect to operate a site in
the manner and in the location the defendant has chosen and expect to be
immune from liability for creating a public nuisance. Defendant’s
argument has no merit in this case.
Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 841 (Ill. 1981).
147.
Id. at 828.
148.
Id.
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anticipatory nuisance.149 But the State’s expert maintained that any subsidence could
be repaired through engineering techniques.150
The case was thus basically about an anticipated nuisance that had yet to
produce damages. Nuisance law traditionally did not recognize such anticipatory
claims.151 After losing in the trial court, SCA Services emphasized this general rule
on appeal, citing a prior decision where the same court refused to enjoin the
operation of a studio featuring nude models over the plaintiffs’ fears of potential
prostitution.152 Even that decision, however, acknowledged that enjoining nuisances
in advance of demonstrated harm is sometimes necessary where, as in this case,
“there can be no doubt but that it is highly probable that the chemical-waste-disposal
site will bring about substantial injury.”153 The state supreme court declared that the
magnitude of adverse consequences could justify an injunction even if that was not
a probable result. 154 The court explained that SCA Services did not “seriously
dispute the severe damage likely to result if substantial amounts of hazardous
substances escaped from the landfill or if the explosions, fires or emissions feared
by plaintiffs occurred.”155 In short, an injunction could be based on a risk assessment
if the magnitude of the adverse consequences were sufficiently ominous.156
149.
Village of Wilsonville, 396 N.E.2d at 555 (“All plaintiffs sought an injunction
on the common law theory of nuisance and the County of Macoupin and the Attorney General
also sought to abate violations of the Environmental Protection Act.”).
150.
See Village of Wilsonville, 426 N.E.2d at 829–30.
151.
See George P. Smith II, Re-Validating The Doctrine Of Anticipatory Nuisance,
29 VT. L. REV. 687, 691 (2005) (citing Earl of Ripon v. Hobart, 40 Eng. Rep. 65, 68 (1834))
(courts of the day chose to focus on actual harm and the uncertainty of future harm in deferring
to what were likely perceived as greater economic interests, instead of weighing the
“magnitude of the evil against the chances of its occurrence”); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (1979) (AM. LAW INST. 1979) (“(1) The appropriateness of the
remedy of injunction against a tort depends upon a comparative appraisal of all of the factors
in the case, including the following primary factors: (a) the nature of the interest to be
protected, (b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies, (c)
any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit, (d) any related misconduct on the part
of the plaintiff, (e) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is granted
and to plaintiff if it is denied, (f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and (g) the
practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.”).
152.
Village of Wilsonville, 396 N.E.2d at 562 (“Defendant refers us to our recent
decisions in People ex rel. Difanis v. Futia, 373 N.E.2d 530, Ill. App. (1978), a case
concerning a request to enjoin the operation of a theater and studio featuring nude female
models.”).
153.
Village of Wilsonville, 426 N.E.2d at 836–37.
154.
Village of Wilsonville, 396 N.E.2d at 562 (“While the foregoing is the general
rule we do not deem it necessary here that the evidence clearly show that the harm envisioned
by plaintiffs’ witnesses will ‘necessarily result’ in order for the danger presented by the
existence and operation of the landfill to be a basis for the injunction.”).
155.
Id.
156.
Id. at 562–63 (citing Barrett v. Mt. Greenwood Cemetery Association, 42 N.E.
891 (Ill. 1896); Springer v. Walters, 28 N.E. 761 (Ill. 1891); Union Drainage District No. 6
v. Manteno Limestone Co., 93 N.E.2d 500 (Ill. App. 1950); Lowe v. Prospect Hill Cemetery
Association, 78 N.W. 488 (Neb. 1899)) (“Springer and Union Drainage District No. 6 speak
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Affirming the trial court’s decision to enjoin the operation, the appellate
court noted that “[b]ecause the danger of escape of the hazardous substances was
not of certain proof and prospective as to actual infliction of injury but of a nature
that would likely be catastrophic if it did occur,” injunctive relief was warranted
under the “threatened tort” theory approved by the Second Restatement of Torts.157
The trial court ordered the company to exhume all the materials from the site and
reclaim the land.158 Although the Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the company’s
allegation that dust and odor alone were generally an insufficient ground for an
injunction, it announced that because of “other evidence indicating that the air,
water, and earth in and around the site will become contaminated,” the court upheld
the trial court’s injunction.159 The state supreme court concluded that the evidence
showed that it was “highly probable” that the toxic material at the site would escape
through explosions, migration, subsidence, or groundwater contamination and
declared that “[a] court does not have to wait for [the harm] to happen before it can
enjoin” an activity. 160 The court thus upheld an anticipatory injunction of the
landfill’s operations based on the neighbors’ reasonable fears concerning the
widespread future negative effects of the landfill.161 This willingness to base a public
nuisance injunction on reasonable public fears and scientific predictions contrasted
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s reluctance to extrapolate from Missouri’s claims
against the effects of Illinois sewage pollution three-quarters of a century earlier.162

of the requirement of certainty of proof that the damage would be substantial rather than
insubstantial. Here, there is little dispute that the damages would be very substantial if the
fears of the plaintiffs materialize. Both opinions, however, also emphasize that, as here, the
damage feared would take place only in the distant future and that this was a reason why an
injunction was inappropriate. Barrett and Lowe, on the other hand, approve of injunctive
relief, even though the damage to be prevented was projected in the distant future, after buried
bodies decomposed and the spread of bacteria was caused by seeping groundwaters.”).
157.
Village of Wilsonville, 396 N.E.2d at 563–64 (“In speaking of the propriety of
the remedy of injunction to prevent torts, including nuisances, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 933 (AM. LAW INST. 1979), comment on subsection (1) (1977) states in part: “The
expression ‘threatened tort,’ as used in Subsection (1) of this Section, contemplates, as a
condition for the grant of an injunction, a threat of sufficient seriousness and imminence to
justify coercive relief. The seriousness and imminence of the threat are in a sense independent
of each other, since a serious harm may be only remotely likely to materialize and a trivial
harm may be quite imminent. Yet the two elements must be considered together in the
decision of any given case. The more serious the impending harm, the less justification there
is for taking the chances that are involved in pronouncing the harm too remote.”).
158.
Id. at 567.
159.
Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Serv., Inc., 426 N.E.2d 824, 833–34, 839 (Ill.
1981) (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926))
(“Therefore, we conclude that in fashioning relief in this case the trial court did balance
relative hardship to be caused to the plaintiffs and defendant, and did fashion reasonable relief
when it ordered the exhumation of all material from the site and the reclamation of the
surrounding area. The instant site is akin to Mr. Justice Sutherland’s observation that
‘Nuisance may be merely a right thing in a wrong place like a pig in the parlor instead of the
barnyard.’”), quoted in 2 J. DOOLEY, MODERN TORT LITIGATION § 31.15, at 225 (1977).
160.
Village of Wilsonville, 426 N.E.2d at 837.
161.
Id.
162.
See supra notes 67–72 and accompanying text.
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The Wilsonville case was extended recently in an Illinois case involving
silica sand mining, a key ingredient in hydraulic fracturing producing oil and natural
gas. 163 Employing Wilsonville’s “highly probable” standard, the court ruled that
evidence assembled by neighboring landowners, concerning noise, lights, dust, and
traffic from a mine approved by a local government for round-the-clock operations,
amounted to a public nuisance.164 The same court earlier enjoined construction of a
hog farm as a prospective nuisance based on extensive evidence of potential harms
to the health, safety, and welfare of nearby residents as well as diminished property
values.165
Anticipatory nuisances remain disfavored, as courts generally impose a
high burden of proof, often requiring a likelihood or high probability of damage.166
Some courts refuse to enjoin a use unless and until it causes severe damage,
apparently on the assumption that those injured can be compensated after they are

163.
Whipple v. Village of North Utica, 79 N.E.3d 667, 671 (Ill. App. 2017).
164.
Id. at 680.
165.
Nickels v. Burnett, 798 N.E.2d 817, 826 (Ill. 2003) (granting an injunction
based on extensive evidence of damage to human health and property value, as well as
substantially certainty for injury to occur).
166.
See, e.g., McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apartments, Ltd., 543 P.2d 150, 153
(Ariz. App. 1975) (“[I]n order to enjoin an anticipated nuisance, the nuisance must be highly
probable.”); State ex rel. Village of Los Ranchos de Albuquerque v. City of Albuquerque,
889 P.2d 185, 200–01 (N.M. 1994) (“[T]he anticipated nuisance must be proven so as to make
any argument that it is not a nuisance highly improbable . . . it would be a poor public policy
to permit a municipality to go forward with a project costing millions of dollars that obviously
presented a great likelihood of causing a public nuisance . . . [however], ‘due authorization’
[precludes] any ‘inevitable’ nuisance . . . .”); Cherokee Hills Util. Dist. v. Stanley, 1989 Tenn.
App. LEXIS 429, at *19 (June 9, 1989) (“[A]n anticipatory nuisance will only be enjoined
when [it is shown that] the injury is imminent and certain to occur . . . .”) (emphasis added);
Duff v. Morgantown Energy Assoc., 421 S.E.2d 253, 258 (W.Va. 1992) (explaining that a
prospective nuisance is enjoinable only if “the danger [is] imminent, . . . [and] established by
conclusive evidence . . . if the matter complained of [i]s not a per se nuisance, an injunction
will not be granted”); see also George P. Smith II, Re-Validating the Doctrine of Anticipatory
Nuisance: Emerging Trends in Environmental Law, 29 VT. L. REV. 687, 697 (2005) (referring
to the judicial reluctance to enjoin anticipatory nuisances as the “despotism” of the concept.
Courts are consequently “hesitant” to enjoin a proposed action unless the plaintiff meets a
“very high burden of proof,” reflecting a judicial reluctance to interfere with landowners
“doing with their land as they please or deem reasonable.”).
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injured. 167 That sentiment undermines the capability of the nuisance doctrine to
prevent less probable but potentially catastrophic damages.168
J. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois
Having redirected Chicago’s sewage from Lake Michigan to the
Mississippi River Basin, 169 Illinois attempted to improve Lake Michigan water
quality by challenging Milwaukee’s and other Wisconsin municipalities’ discharges
of raw sewage into the lake. Like the earlier river reversal case, the State filed an
original jurisdiction case in the Supreme Court.170 However, in 1972, a unanimous
Supreme Court declined original jurisdiction and sent the case to federal district
court,171 although Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court did declare that “when we
deal with air or water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common
law.”172 But Douglas presciently observed that new federal laws and regulations
might one day preempt the field of federal water pollution law.173
The case proceeded in the district court, which found that the sewage
discharges constituted a federal common law nuisance, and the Seventh Circuit
affirmed, ruling that the federal Clean Water Act did not preempt the State’s
common law claim.174 In 1981, the Supreme Court reversed, 6–3, determining that
the federal statute’s “comprehensive permit scheme” preempted federal common
167.
See, e.g., Marshall v. Consumers’ Power Co., 237 N.W.2d 266, 283 (Mich.
App. 1975) (“[W]e will not enjoin an injury which is merely anticipated nor interfere where
an apprehended nuisance is doubtful, contingent, conjectural or problematical. A bare
possibility of nuisance or a mere fear or apprehension that injury will result is not enough.”).
The Marshall court was willing to extend the anticipatory nuisance doctrine only to situations
where the nuisance is a “natural or inevitable consequence.” Id.; see also STUART M. SPEISER
ET AL., 7 AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS §§ 20:1, 20:18 (updated Mar. 2019) (“When the injury has
not yet occurred, a nuisance is anticipatory, and a party claiming that an anticipatory
nuisance exists must show that the occurrence of injury or harm is more than conjectural” and
“[d]amages may not be awarded for an anticipated nuisance, but a threatened or anticipated
nuisance can be enjoined under the proper circumstances . . . .”).
168.
See Andrew H. Sharp, Comment, An Ounce of Prevention: Rehabilitating the
Anticipatory Nuisance Doctrine, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 627, 642, 649 (1988) (arguing
that the public should be entitled to protection from both nearly certain effects of a proposed
activity as well as less certain but potentially catastrophic effects of a proposed activity, and
suggesting that anticipatory nuisance should be available “in the environmental [context],
such [as] catastrophic damage causing widespread impairment of health, permanent damage
to natural resources, and latent damages which may or may not be detectable in later years”).
169.
See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
170.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
171.
The Court decided that since the defendants were sub-state units of the State
of Wisconsin, its jurisdiction was governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3), which gave the Court
discretionary jurisdiction over cases brought by states against the citizens of another state,
which the Court interpreted to include sub-state units. Illinois, 406 U.S. at 93–98, 108.
172.
Id. at 103 (apparently correcting dicta in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp.,
401 U.S. 493, 498 n.3 (1971), which had suggested that federal common law nuisance did not
survive Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
173.
Id. at 107.
174.
State of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 157–65 (7th Cir. 1978).
The State of Michigan joined Illinois in the suit.
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law claims, despite two savings clauses in the Act. 175 The opinion discounted
statutory intent, emphasized separation of powers, and questioned judicial
competence to participate in the technicalities of water pollution control. 176
Although the majority recognized that preempting state police powers required a
“clear and manifest” intent on the part of Congress, no such requirement exists for
when federal statutory law supersedes federal common law.177 As a result, the Court
concluded that the statute had “occupied the field through a comprehensive
regulatory program supervised by an expert agency,” preventing courts from
applying “often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity
jurisprudence.”178 A three-member dissent complained that the majority erred in
disregarding the express intent of Congress, as expressed in the savings clauses,
relevant legislative history, and the structure of the statute.179
Two months after its Illinois decision, the Court proceeded to rule that
neither the Clean Water Act nor the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act provided a damages remedy to citizens injured by unauthorized discharges, and
that those statutes preempted federal common law damages claims.180 However, six
years later, in a 5–4 decision, the Court reopened the common law door a bit by

175.
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 313–22 (1981). In
§ 505(e) of the Act, Congress declared that nothing “in this section” would limit other
remedies concerning water pollution, specifically mentioning common law remedies, 33
U.S.C. § 1365(e); in § 510, Congress stated that nothing in the Act would preclude a state
from enforcing standards stricter than those imposed by the Act, § 1370. Justice Rehnquist
interpreted the former provision to not mean that the statute as a whole could not supplant
federal common law; he ruled that the latter provision did not suggest that states could call
upon federal courts to employ federal common law to establish stricter standards than
imposed by the Clean Water Act. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 327–32.
176.
Id. at 343–45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discounting legislative history), 315
(emphasizing separation of powers), 325 (questioning judicial competence and quoting the
district court’s concession that the expert testimony was “over the heads of all of us”).
177.
Id. at 305, 316–17 (discussing the ontological differences between cases in
which the federal power “pre-empts state law,” which presents concerns over infringement of
the traditional state police power, and cases in which the question is “whether federal statutory
or federal common law governs.” In such a case, evidence of a “clear and manifest” purpose
is not required.); see infra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
178.
Id. at 317.
179.
Id. at 332, 339–48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall and Stevens
joined Justice Blackmun’s dissent. The Senate Report on the Clean Water Act stated that the
savings clause in §505(e) “would specifically preserve any rights or remedies under any other
law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain available. Compliance
with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law cause of action for
pollution damages.” S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 81 (1971).
180.
Middlesex Cty. Sewage Dist. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 4–5
(1981) (concerning the dumping of sewage sludge in New York Harbor and offshore). Justice
Stevens (joined by Justice Blackmun) concurred in the result but not the reasoning of the
majority. Id. at 22 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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suggesting that the Clean Water Act’s savings clauses preserved state common law
actions, so long as the state nuisance law was the law of the source state.181
K. American Electric Power v. Connecticut
The nature of the preemption the Court recognized in Milwaukee II and its
progeny was clarified in a suit brought by eight states and New York City, joined by
three nonprofit land trusts, against the five largest carbon emitters in the U.S.
responsible for 25% of domestic electric-power section emissions and 2.5% of
carbon emissions worldwide. 182 The plaintiffs alleged that the carbon emitters
substantially and unreasonably interfered with public rights; therefore, they
constituted federal interstate common law nuisances.183 The district court dismissed
the case as a nonjusticiable political question, but the Second Circuit reversed,
deciding that the suit was not barred by the political question doctrine and upholding
the plaintiffs’ standing.184 The court also concluded that the plaintiffs had stated a
claim under federal common law of nuisance, and that the emissions were federal
common law nuisances because there was no displacement of federal common law
until the Environmental Protection Agency promulgated rules regulating greenhouse
gas emissions.185
The Supreme Court split, 4–4, as to whether the plaintiffs had standing,
thus affirming the Second Circuit.186 But a unanimous Court reversed on the merits.
181.
Int’l Paper Co. v. Oullette, 479 U.S. 481, 498–500 (1987) (foreclosing a suit
based on Vermont nuisance law by landowners residing on the Vermont side of Lake
Champlain against a pulp and paper company discharging water pollutants on the New York
side of the lake, on the ground that allowing the receiving state’s law to govern would
undermine the predictability and efficiency of the Clean Water Act, which assigns pollution
control to the source state). The concurrence authored by Justice Brennan (joined by Justices
Marshall and Blackmun) argued that the landowners should be able to invoke the nuisance
law of either state. Id. at 500 (Brennan, J., concurrence in part). A separate concurrence filed
by Justice Stevens (joined by Justice Blackmun) complained that the majority wrote an
advisory opinion, since the issue of which state law applied was not properly before the Court,
and there was some doubt as to whether there was any difference between Vermont and New
York nuisance law. Id. at 508 (Stevens, J., concurrence in part).
182.
Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 418 (2011). In addition to
Connecticut, the plaintiff states were California, Iowa, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Wisconsin, but New Jersey and Wisconsin bowed out after changes in their
governors.
183.
Id.
184.
According to the court:
City and private entities are not barred by their status from bringing a
public nuisance cause of action . . . [t]he only qualification that the
Supreme Court has placed upon a state bringing a nuisance action against
another state was that ‘the case should be of serious magnitude, clearly
and fully proved.’
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 357, 369 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Missouri
v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906)). The political question doctrine, as articulated by Justice
Brennan in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), requires, among other things, judicial
abstention when there has been “a textually demonstrable commitment of the issue to another
branch of government.”
185.
Am. Elec. Power, 564 U.S. at 419.
186.
Id. at 420.
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Justice Ginsberg’s opinion for the Court clarified that the displacement of federal
common law was a lower bar than preemption of state law, which requires “a clear
and manifest intent” of Congress.187 Instead, displacement of federal common law
requires only that Congress “speak[] directly” to the issue, a distinctly lower
hurdle.188 The upshot was, according to Justice Ginsberg, that the Clean Air Act
itself displaced the federal common law, not the effective implementation of the
statute, as the Second Circuit believed.189
In its American Electric Power opinion, the Court clearly indicated a
distaste for a judicial role filling in the interstices of federal statutes. This distaste is
not based on a concern that a judicial role would conflict with achieving the goals
of the environmental statutes, but instead on the Court’s views of separation of
powers and judicial competency. Perhaps it also reflects an antiregulatory bias.
The legacy of the American Electric Power decision includes the Ninth
Circuit’s rejection of a nuisance claim for damages from the energy industry for
destroying an Alaska village by flooding caused by climate change, rejected on
political question grounds. 190 And the Fifth Circuit let stand a lower court’s
dismissal of a public nuisance claim filed by Gulf Coast residents in Mississippi in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina on political question grounds against numerous
chemical, oil, and power companies.191 One federal court invoked the American
Electric Power precedent to dismiss a climate change suit against fossil fuel
companies by the cities of San Francisco and Oakland based on state common law,
187.
Id. at 423–24.
188.
Id. at 424.
189.
Id., rev’g Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d at 378–81 (ruling that the Clean Air
Act would not displace federal common law until the EPA had promulgated regulations of
greenhouse gas emissions that spoke directly to plaintiffs’ claims).
190.
Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp, 696 F.3d 849, 854–56 (9th
Cir. 2012), aff’g 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
and the Government Accountability Office estimated the damages to the village due to
flooding at between $100 million and $400 million. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO04-142, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES: MOST ARE
AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT FEW QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL ASSISTANCE, at 4*
(Dec. 2003). The village occupied roughly 54 acres in 1953, but just half of that in 2007.
Rachel M. Gregg, Relocating the Village of Kivalina, Alaska Due to Coastal Erosion,
CLIMATE ADAPTATION KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE (Dec. 18, 2010), https://www.cakex.org/casestudies/relocating-village-kivalina-alaska-due-coastal-erosion (last updated Dec. 20, 2019).
191.
Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 718 F.3d 460, 465–66 (5th Cir. 2013), aff’g
839 F.Supp.2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012). The case was originally filed in 2005 and dismissed on
justiciability, political question, and standing grounds. Id. at 465. However, the Fifth Circuit
reversed because the material issues in the case were not exclusively committed by federal
law to federal political branches, thereby resolving the justiciability and political question
grounds, noting the rarity of standing and tort issues being dismissed as nonjusticiable under
the political question doctrine. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 585 F.3d 855, 874–75 (5th
Cir. 2009). However, due to a procedural quirk, the en banc Fifth Circuit reinstated the district
court opinion when that court lost its quorum. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 607 F.3d 1049,
1055 (5th Cir. 2010) (en banc). The plaintiffs unsuccessfully sought to distinguish the case
from the Supreme Court’s American Electric Power decision on the ground that they sought
damages, not injunctive relief, and alleged violations of state nuisance law, not federal
common law.
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deciding that the case actually was one based on the displaced federal common
law.192 The City of New York’s climate change case against multinational oil and
gas companies seeking damages from rising sea levels faltered on similar grounds.193
But the Federal District Court of Maryland, in a meticulous opinion, sent the City
of Baltimore’s nuisance claim seeking to hold fossil-fuel companies accountable for
climate-change costs back to state court.194 Although the lower courts have yet to
resolve the issue of the proper forum for nuisance claims in the climate-change
context, there is little doubt the Supreme Court’s American Electric Power decision
has cast a long shadow over such claims.195 Nonetheless, if the Supreme Court were
192.
City of Oakland v. BP L.L.C, 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
Although the plaintiffs alleged violations of state nuisance law, the defendant companies
successfully removed the cases to federal court, which refused to remand the cases to state
court on the ground that the claim against the companies did not actually sound in state
common law but were “necessarily governed by federal common law” because
they depend on a global complex of geophysical cause and effect
involving all nations of the planet (and the oceans and atmosphere). It
necessarily involves the relationships between the United States and all
other nations. It demands to be governed by as universal a rule of
apportioning responsibility as is available . . . [P]laintiffs’ claims, if any,
are governed by federal common law.
Id. at 1021 (quoting from the court’s earlier February 27, 2018 order). The court proceeded
to rule that federal common law was displaced under the American Electric Power reasoning
as well as for interfering with separation of powers and foreign policy. Id. at 1024–28. The
cities have appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit.
But another federal court refused the defendant companies’ request to remove
a case brought by several other California counties and cities under state law to federal court,
ruling that whether the claims are preempted was a matter for state courts to initially decide;
plaintiffs have since appealed this refusal to remove to the Ninth Circuit. County of San Mateo
v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (appealed to the 9th Cir. Ct. App.,
Docket No: 18-15503, County of Marin v. Chevron Corporation et al., filed Mar. 27, 2018).
For more on these cases, see Albert C. Lin & Michael Burger, State Nuisance Claims and
Climate Change Adaptation, 36 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 49, 51–54 (2018). See also id. at 67–
73 (considering several defenses for avoiding the merits of state nuisance law claims), 73–91
(discussing the substance of state nuisance law claims concerning lead paint, PCBs, and
climate change).
193.
City of New York v. BP L.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475–76 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(ruling that the case sounded in the displaced of federal common law nuisance, and that claims
against the foreign emissions of the companies were barred by a presumption against
extraterritoriality and the need for judicial caution concerning foreign affairs).
194.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 572–
74 (D. Md. 2019), as amended (June 20, 2019) (rejecting the defendant’s preemption claims
and averring that the plaintiffs’ choice to file in state court deserved respect).
195.
There were no fewer than eight pending climate-change nuisance cases in
various stages of litigation in 2018. See Michael Burger, Update: Upcoming Hearings on
Motions to Dismiss Climate Change Nuisance Cases in California and New York, SABIN CTR.
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L. BLOG (May 23, 2018), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange
/2018/05/23/update-upcoming-hearings-on-motions-to-dismiss-climate-change-nuisancecases-in-california-and-new-york/. A federal district court rejected congressional
displacement in the context of public trust claims against damage to trust resources as a result
of atmospheric pollution. Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1260 (D. Or. 2016)
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(recognizing that “public trust claims are unique because they concern “inherent limits on
sovereignty . . . . A defining feature . . . is that [public trust duties] cannot be legislated away.
Because of the nature of public trust claims, a displacement analysis simply does not apply.”).
See Michael C. Blumm & Mary Christina Wood, No Ordinary Lawsuit: Climate Change,
Due Process, and the Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 52 (2017); Gerald Torres,
No Ordinary Lawsuit: The Public Trust and the Duty to Confront Climate Disruption–
Commentary on Blumm and Wood, 67 AM. U. L. REV. F. 49, 54 (2018).
A recent climate change-related suit was filed by the Pacific Coast Federation
of Fishermen’s Associations (“PCFFA”), the largest commercial fishing industry trade group
on the West Coast, which sued in California state court, alleging that major actors in the fossil
fuel industry warmed the planet and severely damaged the crabbing industry. Compl. Pac.
Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Chevron, Case No. CGC-18-571285, Sup. Ct. of Cal.
In and For the County of San Francisco (filed Nov. 14, 2018). The PCFFA alleged that in just
the last three years, rising ocean temperature led to regular closures of the Dungeness crab
fisheries, and that the defendant industries have known for nearly a half-century that
unrestricted production and use of their fossil fuel products create greenhouse gas pollution
that warms the planet, changes the climate, and disrupts the oceans. Despite this knowledge,
the industries allegedly:
engaged in a coordinated, multi-front effort to conceal and deny their own
knowledge of those threat[s], discredit the growing body of publicly
available scientific evidence, and persistently create doubt in the minds of
customers, consumers, regulators, the media, journalists, teachers, and the
public about the reality and consequences of the impacts of their fossil fuel
pollution. At the same time, Defendants have promoted and profited from
a massive increase in the extraction and consumption of oil, coal, and
natural gas, which has in turn caused an enormous, foreseeable, and
avoidable increase in global greenhouse gas pollution and an
accompanying increase in the concentration of greenhouse gases,
particularly carbon dioxide (“CO2”) and methane, in the atmosphere.
Those disruptions of Earth’s otherwise balance, d carbon cycle have
substantially contributed to a wide range of dire climate-related effects,
including global warming, rising atmospheric and ocean temperatures,
ocean acidification, melting polar ice caps and glaciers, more extreme and
volatile weather, sea level rise, and marine heatwaves with concomitant
harmful algal blooms. Families and businesses that depend on the health
and productivity of the Dungeness crab fishery to earn their livings suffer
the consequences.
Id. at 1–2, § 1, ¶ 2. A Center For Progressive Reform study featured the crabbers’ suit as one
of its case studies of how climate victims are seeking justice through tort law, Thomas
McGarity, Sidney Shapiro, Karen Sokol & David Flores, Climate Justice: State Courts and
the Fight for Equity, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2019), http://www.progressive
reform.org/ClimateJustice.cfm. Like the argument of the commercial fishermen in the
Columbia River Fishermen’s Protective Union, supra notes 90–96 and accompanying text,
the crabbers argued they suffered an injury special to them, more significant than general
harm to the public as a whole. They therefore claimed they suffered special injury because of
the economic hardships caused by the prohibitions on their commercial crab harvests.
Whether their claims will founder on federal displacement is unknown as of this writing.
Other case studies featured in the CPR study included: 1) a suit by the City of Baltimore
against 26 fossil-fuel companies alleging nuisance and trespass, and negligence, among other
claims, which a federal court sent back to state court over the defendant companies’
objections; 2) a suit filed against dozens of fossil-fuel companies by a San Diego-area city
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to conclude that federal jurisdiction did not extend to fills of isolated wetlands196 or
groundwater injectate that pollutes jurisdictional waters, 197 there would be no
displacement of nuisance law, as applied to those actions.
L. McKiver v. Murphy-Brown
If most climate change-related nuisance suits seem unlikely to pass
Supreme Court muster due to the Court’s willingness to discount congressional
intent in the savings clauses of the pollution control statutes, nuisance suits against

damaged by erosion and flooding due to sea level rise, alleging nuisance, trespass, and
negligence, among other claims; and 3) a negligence suit filed by Houston-area residents
flooded by Hurricane Harvey in 2017 and damaged by a resulting fire at chemical plant in the
floodplain. McGarity, Shapiro, Sokol & Flores, supra.
The Baltimore suit was one of three filed in state courts in which there were
unsuccessful efforts on the part of fossil-fuel companies to remove the cases to federal suit,
the two others being filed by the State of Rhode Island and the City of Boulder, Colorado.
The companies appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking a stay of the state court proceedings.
See Jennifer Hijazi, Baltimore: Big Oil ‘Offers No Basis’ for Emergency Sstay, CLIMATEWIRE
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/stories/1061340623.
196.
Federal jurisdiction over so-called isolated wetlands (those not immediately
connected to navigable waterbodies) has been muddled since the Court’s decision in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 162 (2001)
(striking down the Corps’ reliance on guidance that suggested federal jurisdiction extended
to all waters used by migratory birds). Later, in Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 786–
87 (2006), a Court majority struck down the federal regulation asserting jurisdiction over
waters adjacent to tributaries on the reach of the Clean Water Act. A plurality (authored by
Justice Scalia) would have required a surface water connection with a jurisdictional
waterbody, but Justice Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote, determined that federal
jurisdiction should extend to all wetlands with “significant nexus” to jurisdiction waters. The
Obama Administration responded with a 2015 regulation largely implementing Justice
Kennedy’s significant nexus test, Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Water of the United
States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 (proposed June 29, 2015), which prompted numerous challenges,
and questions over whether the challenges should proceed in federal district or circuit courts.
The Supreme Court settled the question of the proper initial forum for such challenges in
favor of district courts in Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. Dept of Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617, 623–24
(2018), and that litigation is proceeding with inconsistent results. For example, in mid-2019,
there were 22 states in which the Obama rule was in effect and 28 in which it was not.
Conversation with Professor Craig Johnston (July 9, 2019). Meanwhile, in February 2019,
the Trump Administration proposed a rule to revoke the Obama Administration regulation
and roll back federal jurisdiction, largely invoking the surface-water connection definition of
Justice Scalia’s opinion. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg.
4154-01 (proposed Feb. 14, 2019). According to one analysis, the Trump rule could eliminate
federal protection for half of the nation’s wetlands. Ryan Richard, Debunking the Trump
Administrations New Water Rule, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 27, 2019, 9:01 AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news/2019/03/27/467697/debunking-trumpadministrations-new-water-rule/.
197.
In Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018),
cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019), the Supreme Court agreed to review a Ninth
Circuit decision that affirmed a district court decision that the county violated the Clean Water
Act by discharging treated sewage without a permit into wells that polluted adjacent ocean
waters a half-mile distant.
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activities not subject to environmental regulation remain unaffected. 198 A prime
example concerns a series of nuisance claims against the North Carolina hog farm
industry, the initial case being a jury’s award of over $50 million in 2018 to
neighboring landowners for compensatory and punitive damages for noxious odors,
truck traffic, and loss of the use and enjoyment of their lands due to flies, pests, and
other harms that effectively foreclosed many outdoor activities.199 The award was
subsequently reduced by a federal judge because of the state’s cap on punitive
damages,200 but several other decisions followed, awarding even greater damages
against the hog farm owner, WH Group, Ltd., a Chinese company that purchased
Smithfield Foods and its subsidiary, Murphy-Brown, LLC, in 2013. 201 In all,
plaintiffs had filed at least 26 different nuisance suits by late 2018.202
Although Smithfield has been unable to prevail in jury trials, the company
has mounted a number of defenses typical of nuisance defendants, and some not so
typical. A longstanding defense, dating back to Aldred, is the utility of the
operation.203 Smithfield and its allies in the livestock, grocery, and related industries,
198.
See Jonathan Morris, Comment, “One Ought Not Have So Delicate a Nose”:
CAFOs, Agricultural Nuisance, and the Rise of the Right to Farm, 47 ENVTL. L. 261, 263, 286
(2017) (discussing the effects of recent right-to-farm amendments to state constitutions and
the resulting uncertainty in state regulation of agriculture: “[t]he long-term effects of these
amendments are unclear, and the breadth and relevance of these amendments will be decided
by each state’s judicial interpretation, leading to an uncertain future for the regulation of
agriculture. If an agricultural facility is compliant with state and federal laws and is effectively
insulated from nuisance liability, what reason does it have to consider the harm suffered by
neighbors as a result of its operations?”).
199.
See R.J. Vogt, NC Swine Stench Sufferers Win Landmark $50M Jury Award,
LAW360 (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1037960. The case, McKiver v.
Murphy-Brown LLC, No. 7:14-CV-180-BR 2018 WL 6606061, at *1 (E.D.N.C. De. 17, 2018)
(rejecting Murphy-Brown’s post-judgment motions to set aside the jury award under the
state’s Right to Farm Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §106-701 (amended in 2013)), has been appealed
to the Fourth Circuit.
200.
See Rachel Graf, NC Swine Stench Sufferers’ $50M Punitive Damages
Slashed, LAW360 (May 7, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1041167/nc-swine-stench
-sufferers-50m-punitive-damages-slashed (explaining that the judge enforced the state’s cap
on punitive damages of three times compensatory damages, limiting the McKiver plaintiffs
to $225,000 apiece, or $2.25 million in all).
201.
H. Claire Brown, North Carolina Jury Awards Neighbors $473.5 Million in
Smithfield Hog Waste Suit, COUNTER (Aug. 3, 2018), https://thecounter.org/north-carolinajury-fines-smithfield-foods-nuisance-lawsuit-hog-farm-manure/. The plaintiffs in the suits
consistently emphasized that Smithfield Foods was sold for an estimated $7 billion and
generated a reported net income of $105.3 million in 2014, the year the plaintiffs filed suit
alleging that the company had the resources to clean up the nuisances. See Graf, supra note
200.
202.
See Brown, supra note 201.
203.
See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text; see also John C. Nagle, Moral
Nuisances, 50 EMORY L.J. 265, 272 (2001) (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS
§§ 827, 828 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)) (“The gravity of the harm is measured by its extent, its
character, its suitability for the location, the social value of the plaintiff’s use or enjoyment,
and the ability of the plaintiff to avoid the harm. The utility of the harm is measured by its
social value, its suitability for the location, and the ability of the defendant to prevent the
harm.”).
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including the United States Chamber of Commerce,204 claimed that the value of the
hog industry in the state outweighed any inconveniences they may cause to
neighbors.205 Similarly, the company alleged that it had employed the best available
technology to curb emissions,206 and that its operations were in locations suitable for
hog farms.207 Smithfield supplemented these typical defenses with more unusual
ones: (1) preventing the North Carolina legislature from enacting proposed changes
to nuisance law during the pendency of the litigation and limiting damage awards to
losses in land value and excluding “quality of life” injuries;208 and (2) benefiting
when the presiding judge of the Fourth Circuit removed the trial judge of the first
five trials.209 The new judge paid immediate dividends to Smithfield, ruling that the
proof in the case before him did not warrant an award of punitive damages.210
The initial success of the plaintiffs in the hog farm cases reflects the
continuing value of the nuisance cause of action to landowners substantially and

204.
Brief for North American Meat Institute, National Association of
Manufacturers, Grocery Manufacturers Association, Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America, National Turkey Federation, and National Chicken Council as Amici
Curiae Supporting Appellant at 1–4, McKiver v. Murphy-Brown, LLC, No. 7:14-CV-180BR 2019 WL 1010752 (4th Cir., filed Mar. 6, 2019).
205.
See id. at 4–5.
206.
Corrected Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 5–7, McKiver v. MurphyBrown LLC, No. 7:14-CV-00180-BR 2019 WL 1010752 (4th Cir. filed Feb. 27, 2019).
207.
Id. at 7.
208.
Id. at 46–49 (explaining that the legislature, which had been expected to adopt
§ 478 of the Second Restatement of Torts, which would have expressly imposed vicarious
liability for nuisances on landlords (like Smithfield), eventually decided not to incorporate
these changes). After the lawsuit, state lawmakers responded in North Carolina’s 2017 and
2018 farm bills, which added new legal protections for the agricultural industry by restricting
the ability of people living near farms to bring nuisance suits. Will Doran, After Smithfield
Lost Millions in Lawsuits, NC Changed a Law. Was It Constitutional?, NEWS & OBSERVER
(June 19, 2019, 6:21 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article
231726683.html. North Carolina’s then governor, Roy Cooper, expressed concerns that the
state’s updated nuisance laws could have detrimental effects in other parts of the state,
pointing to the state’s use of nuisance laws to reduce pollution created by the Tennessee
Valley Authority. Id. The 2018 farm bill, passed amid the Smithfield trials, disallowed
nuisance lawsuits unless filed within a year of the establishment of the agriculture operation
or within a year of “fundamental change.” Annie Blythe, Think the Hog Farm Next Door
Stinks? Lawmakers Limit Neighbors From Making a Big Stink in Court, NEWS & OBSERVER
(June 14, 2018, 7:22 PM), https://www.newsobserver.com/news/politics-government/article
213046124.html. However, a fundamental change does not include “changes in ownership,
technology, product or size of the operation.” Id.
209.
See Emery P. Dalesio, Hog Nuisance Trials Get New Judge After 3 Industry
Losses, AP NEWS (Aug. 9, 2018), https://apnews.com/4df29d932c374027acd05e56fe1af07f
/Hog-nuisance-trials-get-new-judge-after-3-industry-losses.
210.
See Blythe, supra note 208.
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unreasonably affected211 by traditional types of nuisances.212 However, owners of
some of these nuisances, if they are economically powerful enough, can certainly
work to obtain the same sort of preemption through the state legislature that the
Supreme Court attributed to congressional displacement in the federal pollution
control statutes.213 The North Carolina legislature is hardly the only example of a
legislature redefining nuisance law; in fact, all fifty states have enacted some form
of right-to-farm laws shielding qualified farmers from nuisance lawsuits stemming
from noise, odors, visual clutter, and dangerous structures.214 But some courts have
211.
See Morris, supra note 198, at 270–72 (discussing a series of nuisance cases
involving hog farms, beginning with Commonwealth v. Van Sickle, 7 Pa. L.J. 82 (Pa. 1845),
State v. Payson, 37 Me. 361 (1853), City of Baltimore v. Sackett, 107 A. 557 (Md. 1919), and
Smiths v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 517 (1848)). Van Sickle involved a large hog farm within the
city limits of Pennsylvania, in which the noxious odor and devaluing of nearby property was
held to constitute a nuisance. Id. at 270–71. In Payson, the court extended the nuisance
doctrine to the actual feed defendants were using for their hogs. Id. at 271. In Sackett, the
defendants sought to establish a hog farm within the limits of Baltimore. 107 A. at 559–60.
Plaintiffs sought an injunction, which the court ultimately denied in holding that “mere
allegation” is not sufficient and that facts must be stated which can satisfy to the court that
the allegation is “well founded.” Id. at 560. This case seems to contemplate and reinforce the
idea that courts are generally unwilling to apply the anticipatory nuisance doctrine. In
McConathy, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that there can be no private nuisance unless
“it be attended to with some damage or inconvenience to the party injured.” 11 Mo. at 522.
The Court also distinguished public nuisances, where an individual must show that they
“suffered a special damage . . . over and above the injury which the community at large
suffer.” Id. These cases demonstrate a long history of private nuisance claims based on hog
farms, albeit usually being limited to success only in cases in which the plaintiffs can
demonstrate sufficient proof that the nuisance was actually to their detriment. See also Nagle,
supra note 203, at 272 (stating that especially in the case of moral nuisances, an invasion is
“unreasonable if it causes significant harm and the defendant’s conduct is ‘contrary to
common standards of decency’”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 829(b) (AM.
LAW INST. 1979)).
212.
The same should be true of public officials alleging substantial and
unreasonable interferences with public rights.
213.
See supra Section I.K.
214.
See Alexandra Lizano & Elizabeth Rumley, States’ Right-To-Farm Statutes,
NAT. AGRIC. LAW CTR., https://nationalaglawcenter.org/state-compilations/right-to-farm/
(last updated Jan. 23, 2019) (all 50 states); e.g., MO. CONST. art. I, § 35 (“[A]griculture . . . is
the foundation and stabilizing force of Missouri’s economy. To protect this
vital . . . economy, the right of farmers and ranchers to engage in farming and ranching
practices shall be forever guaranteed in this state”); OR. REV. STAT. § 30-930 (2019); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2012); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.48.300–320 (West 2020).
In Moon v. North Idaho Farmers Ass’n, 96 P.3d 637, 640 (Idaho 2004), involving a state law
that effectively extinguished liability for North Idaho grass farmers burning in compliance
with its provisions, the Idaho Supreme Court decided that there was no unconstitutional taking
of the right to maintain a nuisance because Idaho, unlike the Restatement, recognized that the
right to maintain a nuisance was not the equivalent of an easement (the taking of which would
require government compensation). Id. at 644. Many states have also passed what are
commonly referred to as “ag-gag” laws, which seek to silence whistleblowers and undercover
activists by punishing them criminally for recording footage of what goes on in animal
agriculture. See Ag-Gag Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL DEF. FUND, https://aldf.org/issue/ag-gag/ (last
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ruled that legislative removal of the right of landowners to defend property rights
was a taking, requiring payment of constitutional compensation.215 If the reasoning
of these cases were widely adopted, nuisance law would at least ensure that
legislation authorizing actions that substantially and unreasonably affect
neighboring landowners or public rights pay the full economic costs of their
operations.216

II. LESSONS FROM THE LANDMARKS
This review of landmark nuisance cases shows the doctrine has mirrored
Holmes’ felt necessities of the times,217 originally protecting plaintiffs’ traditional
agrarian and domestic uses, later becoming sensitive to defendants’ costs and the
social utility of industrial activities.218 As long as four hundred years ago, in Aldred,
courts invoked the “golden rule” that one landowner should not damage the land of
another.219
That rule evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to become a
rule of “no unreasonable interference.”220 But reasonableness originally was a very
narrow determination, emphasizing preservation of residential and domestic uses,
not a free-wheeling balancing of the relative social and economic value of the
conflicting uses.221 So long as there were tangible, physical damages caused by a
neighboring use, liability was nearly strict. 222 Thus, courts approved injunctions
against copper smelting and gold mining blasting in the nineteenth and
earlytwentieth century, as the defendant industries’ claims of costs and overriding
social utility were insufficient to override the physical damage they caused
visited Jun. 20, 2019). Currently, Montana, North Dakota, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Arkansas
and North Carolina have passed ag-gag laws; however, the laws’ validity is under challenge
in Kansas, Iowa, and North Carolina. See id.
215.
See, e.g., Marcas, L.L.C. v. Bd. Cty. Comm'rs of St. Mary’s Cty., No. WGC07-196, 2012 WL 13008755 at *4 (D. Md. Apr. 16 2012) (ruling that a local government’s
statutory damages cap is not immune from takings’ claims when it damages real property);
Gacke v. Pork Xtra, L.L.C., 684 N.W.2d 168, 171 (Iowa 2004) (holding that a statute
depriving property owners of a remedy for nuisance takings caused by animal feeding
operations was unconstitutional); Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W.2d 309, 316 (Iowa
1998) (deciding that a county’s designation of an “agricultural area” eliminating landowner
rights to protect their lands through nuisance amounted to a taking of their property rights,
requiring compensation under the state constitution’s due process clause); see also Fraley,
supra note 61, at 677–80 (discussing the effect of nuisance balancing on takings law).
216.
See, e.g., Alexander A. Reinert, The Right to Farm: Hog-Tied and NuisanceBound, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1694, 1701–02 (1998); see also Comment, Internalizing
Externalities: Nuisance Law and Economic Efficiency, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 219, 228–32
(1978).
217.
See HOLMES, supra note 24.
218.
See supra text following note 39, notes 41, 44, 56, 61 and accompanying text
(protection of traditional uses); notes 53, 105, 121–24 and accompanying text (emphasizing
defendants’ costs and social utility balanced against a plaintiff’s injury).
219.
The doctrine eschewed aesthetic protection. See supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
220.
See supra notes 27, 61, 105 and accompanying text.
221.
See supra note 61.
222.
See supra text following note 39, notes 50, 52 and accompanying text.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3408549

444

ARIZONA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 62:403

neighboring lands, especially when the damage was to domestic and traditional
agrarian uses.223
But distant downstream pollution was initially rejected by the Supreme
Court on causation grounds, due to perceived insufficient scientific evidence. 224
However, the Court quickly clarified that demonstrable physical damage produced
by interstate air pollution was enjoinable.225 One could imagine a similar judicial
evolution concerning climate-change cases.
In the mid-twentieth century, the definition of reasonableness evolved to
become the overriding criterion in nuisance doctrine according to the Restatements
and many courts.226 The effect was to equip courts with broad authority to make
decisions about alleged nuisances, both public and private, and their effects on
neighbors and environmental quality under a vague “balancing of the equities” test
that gave the judiciary license to declare nuisances or to decline to do so on their
version of social utility grounds. 227 Both social utility and costs to defendants,
factors that earlier were relevant only as to whether a plaintiff could obtain an
injunction or had to settle for damages, became central to whether a plaintiff could
obtain any relief at all.228
Nuisance case law also embraced a number of defenses that made the
doctrine friendlier to defendants and avoided having the courts stand in the way of
the Industrial Revolution. 229 These defenses included suitability to the location,
temporal priority, best available technology, and standing in public nuisance
cases.230 Injunctions came under criticism on social utility grounds,231 and law-andeconomics academics helped lead the charge for increased use of a damages remedy

223.
224.
225.
226.

See supra Sections I.B, I.C.
See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 822(d)(i) (AM. LAW INST. 1939);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821A (AM. LAW INST. 1979); see also supra notes 61,
105.
227.
See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing Lexington & Ohio Rail
Road Co. v. Applegate, a rare pre-Civil War case that contemplated adaption of the nuisance
doctrine to economic development); see also Section I.H and accompanying text (discussing
the Boomer case).
228.
See supra note 105 and accompanying text (citing Fraley, supra note 61, at
671–77).
229.
See supra Section I.B. See generally HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 74–78; Kurtz,
supra note 23, at 670; Lewin, supra note 23, at 781 (discussing the comparative hardship
doctrine of nuisance law).
230.
See supra notes 42, 47–49, 82–86, 126–28, 134–37, 93–104 and
accompanying text (discussing location, temporal priority, best available technology, and
special injury).
231.
See supra notes 121–23, 129 and accompanying text; see also Peter D. Junger,
A Recipe for Bad Water: Welfare Economics and Nuisance Law Mixed Well, 27 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 3, 270–71 (1976) (suggesting that in cases where the plaintiff can avoid the
effects of pollution at reasonable cost but the defendant cannot “the optimal allocation will
be reached by denying the injunction and leaving it to the plaintiff to avoid the pollution,”
although damages may be in order).
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rather than injunctive relief on efficiency grounds.232 Some courts shied away from
using nuisance doctrine to effectuate what they considered to be social policy
beyond their institutional capacity, 233 foreshadowing the Supreme Court’s
unwillingness to embrace nuisance remedies as complementary to statutory
remedies.234
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the Supreme Court
decided that nuisance law was no longer fit to play a role in curbing interstate
pollution, including climate change.235 The Court was able to do so by overlooking
clear congressional intent to preserve common law remedies along with the statutory
remedies it erected.236 Nuisance remains a vibrant doctrine when it is not displaced,
as evidenced by McKiver and related hog-farm litigation.237 So it might also yet play
a role in environmental litigation, as the Supreme Court has yet to rule that sourcestate nuisance law has been displaced, 238 and deregulatory decisions involving
resources like wetlands and groundwater may rekindle nuisance law in the pollution
area.239 Lower courts have, however, ruled that state common law nuisance causes
regarding greenhouse gas emissions sound in federal common law, regardless of
plaintiffs’ pleadings of violations of state common law. 240 If those decisions
withstand appeals, 241 the role of nuisance in environmental cases will center on
localized disputes over mostly unregulated activities. However, McKiver and related
cases illustrate that nuisance law can be successfully invoked against large animal
feedlot operations.242
Large, well-financed defendants may be able to successfully defeat
nuisance claims by invoking the balancing of economic equities, now at the heart of
determining what a reasonable use is, at least in some courts.243 By emphasizing the
232.
See supra notes 125–37 and accompanying text (discussing remedies in the
Boomer decision); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 620–21 (7th
ed. 2007).
233.
See supra notes 125–26, 141 and accompanying text; see also Boomer v. Atl.
Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970) (“A court performs its essential function when
it decides the rights of parties before it . . . . It is a rare exercise of judicial power to use a
decision in private litigation as a purposeful mechanism to achieve direct public objectives
greatly beyond the rights and interests before the court.”).
234.
See supra notes 169–90 and accompanying text (discussing Milwaukee v.
Illinois and American Electric Power v. Connecticut).
235.
See supra Sections I.J, I.K.
236.
See supra notes 175, 179 and accompanying text (discussing the savings
clauses in the Clean Water Act).
237.
See supra Section I.L.
238.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing International Paper
Co. v. Oullette).
239.
See supra notes 196–98 and accompanying text.
240.
See supra notes 182–94 and accompanying text (discussing American Electric
Power and other cases in which the plaintiffs tried to file state nuisance claims addressing
interstate pollution where the courts found federal common law the proper cause of action,
and therefore statutorily displaced).
241.
See supra notes 192–95 and accompanying text.
242.
See supra notes 198–210 and accompanying text.
243.
See supra notes 61, 105 and accompanying text.
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social utility of their operations as well as their spillover economic effects,
defendants in these states have the capability to win the balancing, even if, as in
Boomer, they must pay damages. 244 Sovereign plaintiffs may fare better in this
balancing, as their involvement may encourage reluctant courts to reach the merits
of nuisance claims.245 But sovereigns often exercise prosecutorial discretion to not
proceed against large-scale in-state operations, 246 and out-of-state polluters are
seemingly shielded by the Supreme Court’s displacement decision, at least from
downstream state laws.247 The long history of bias against anticipatory nuisances
makes nuisance appear to be a poor fit in cases calling for risk assessment, but there
are emerging exceptions.248
On the other hand, expanded use of trespass to combat many traditional
nuisances could signal a path for nuisance plaintiffs in the future, 249 effectively
reducing the defenses that alleged nuisances have so often successfully invoked.250
Many alleged nuisances can be characterized as trespasses, and several courts have
blended trespass and nuisance law. 251 Juries have shown a willingness to award
punitive damages in nuisance cases, 252 although state legislative preemption of
nuisance liability is now commonplace.253 Only a few courts have been willing to
conclude that legislation eliminating nuisance causes of action worked a
244.
See supra notes 116–24 and accompanying text (discussing Boomer).
245.
Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970) (discussing an
award of damages despite a marked disparity in economic effects to the defendant and the
community compared to the benefit to plaintiffs).
246.
For example, in the Columbia River Fishermen’s Protective Union case, supra
notes 90–96 and accompanying text, neither the City of St. Helens nor the State of Oregon
sought to enjoin the water pollution.
247.
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011), discussed
supra section I.K (Clean Air Act displaced federal common law, relying on City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 91 (1981)).
248.
See supra notes 144–69 and accompanying text (discussing the Village of
Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc. and the anticipatory nuisance doctrine).
249.
A recent Pennsylvania case substantially expanded trespass law in that state
by determining that a fracking operator could trespass by draining oil and gas embedded in
shale under a neighbor’s lands through the fracking operation. Briggs v. Southwestern Energy
Prod. Co., 184 A.3d 153, 163 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (“[H]ydraulic fracturing may constitute
an actional trespass where subsurface fractures . . . cross boundary lines and extend into the
subsurface estate of an adjoining property for which the operator does not have a mineral
license”), vacated, 224 A.2d 334 (Pa. 2020). An expansive trespass law could displace
nuisance balancing, which many consider to be loaded in favor of defendants.
250.
See supra notes 105–15 and accompanying text (discussing Martin v.
Reynolds Metals Co. and its potential role in conflating the trespass and traditional nuisance
doctrines).
251.
See supra note 112; see also Jill M. Fraley, Liability for Unintentional
Nuisances: How the Restatement of Torts Almost Negligently Killed the Right to Exclude in
Property Law, 121 W.VA. L. REV. 419, 421–22, 447–48 (2018) (discussing the relationship
between trespass, nuisance, and pollution); Anthony Z. Roisman & Alexander Wolff,
Trespass by Pollution: Remedy by Mandatory Injunction, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 157,
161 (2010).
252.
See supra Section I.L (discussing punitive damages for nuisance granted
against North Carolina hog farms).
253.
See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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constitutional taking of plaintiffs’ property rights, requiring payment of just
compensation, 254 but the issue is far from settled. Without a compensation
requirement, legislatures can eliminate neighboring property rights without cost.

CONCLUSION
The long history of nuisance law reflects its protean nature, reflecting the
Holmesian “felt necessities.” 255 The doctrine was sufficiently robust to enjoin
nineteenth century gold mining and copper smelter pollution cases that resulted in
demonstrable physical injury. 256 But what had been a largely antidevelopmental
doctrine aimed at protecting traditional and domestic land uses in a static agrarian
society evolved during the Industrial Revolution to accommodate the substantial
economic and technological changes at work in nineteenth and early twentieth
century America. 257 Later, in the mid-twentieth century, the Restatements
encouraged state courts to further revise nuisance doctrine to include balancing the
costs imposed on defendants as part of the prima facie case of whether there was a
nuisance at all, not just whether an injunction served the public interest.258
This shift in nuisance doctrine, where it occurred, combined with the
proliferation of nuisance defenses,259 made nuisance less threatening to defendants.
And the Supreme Court’s willingness to narrowly interpret the savings clauses in
statutes like the Clean Air and Water Acts allowed the Court to overlook apparent
congressional intent and sanction displacement of both federal common law
nuisance and receiving state common law,260 making successful interstate nuisance
claims unlikely. These decisions have nearly eliminated nuisance from interstate
pollution control, although the Court has yet to discard the source state’s nuisance
law.261 But if the Court were to narrowly construe federal environmental legislation
to not reach resources like isolated wetlands or groundwater, congressional
displacement would no longer foreclose nuisance remedies. Thus, an antiregulatory
Court could ironically revive nuisance as a relevant environmental doctrine. Such a
revival would be entirely consistent with congressional intent,262 however shocking
a result it would seem to the architects of modern environmental law.263

254.
See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing cases where legislation
eliminating a nuisance cause of action results in a compensable taking).
255.
See HOLMES, supra note 24.
256.
See supra Sections I.C, I.E (discussing Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel
Mining Co. and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.).
257.
See HORWITZ, supra note 22, at 76–77.
258.
See Fraley, supra note 61, at 654–55.
259.
See supra notes 12–17, 34–35, 53, 200, 203–10 and accompanying text.
260.
See supra notes 187–96 and accompanying text.
261.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text. Some lower courts have, however,
and appeals from those decisions are pending. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
262.
See supra notes 175–76 and accompanying text.
263.
The architects aimed to have the new legislative regime to supersede the
inefficient and overly discretionary common law (although they clearly did not think the
statutes would “displace” common law causes of action). On the origins of modern
environmental law, see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 47
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McKiver and related hog farm cases display nuisance’s continued viability
concerning local land use controversies that do not implicate federal displacement
or state preemption.264 Nuisance remedies could evolve in the future if more courts
adopt a blending of trespass and nuisance doctrines, as in Martin v. Reynold
Metals.265 By eliminating defenses centered around reasonableness balancing from
the prima facie nuisance case, this evolution would work to restore early nuisance
doctrine’s unwillingness to allow the defendant’s alleged economic value and social
utility to outweigh physical damage to neighboring lands, especially to domestic and
residential uses.266 A reduced role for balancing would return nuisance doctrine to
its roots267 as well as making it more relevant to the twenty-first century and its
climatic challenges.
On the other hand, as the costs of greenhouse gas emissions become more
apparent, reasonableness balancing could lead reviewing courts interpreting local
nuisance law to conclude that large fossil-fuel emitters are in fact public
nuisances.268 Nuisance liability might be more likely in suits brought by sovereign
governments,269 although the private plaintiffs should be able to pass the standing
hurdle for public nuisance.270 More threatening to nuisance claimants are decisions
like the district court in the City of Oakland case, which concluded that nuisance
cases concerning atmospheric pollution sound in federal common law regardless of
how they were pled,271 sending plaintiffs to the displaced federal common law. Such

(2004) (discussing the Arlie House conference of 1969); see also THOMAS P. ALDER, FROM
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT TO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: A FOUNDER’S RECOLLECTIONS
(2019), https://www.eli.org/sites/default/files/docs/founders_report.pdf (discussing events
prior to the Arlie House conference as well as the conference itself).
264.
See supra Section I.L.
265.
See supra Section I.G (discussing Martin).
266.
See supra Sections I.B, I.C, I.E (discussing St. Helens Smelting Co. v. Tipping,
Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., and Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.).
267.
See Fraley, supra note 61, at 654–55 (discussing the limited balancing in
nuisance doctrine prior to the mid-twentieth century).
268.
These courts could be state courts reviewing state nuisance law claims, or
federal courts doing the same under diversity jurisdiction. Interstate pollution claims would
be possible under International Paper Co. v. Oullette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987), where the Court
apparently recognized the receiving state’s common law as saved by the Clean Water Act.
See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s Oullette decision).
269.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007),
indicated relaxed standing requirements for sovereign governments, citing Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907). See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
270.
Although it was a public trust case, the plaintiffs in Juliana v. United States,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1242–48 (D. Or. 2016), rev’d on standing grounds, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th
Cir. 2020), demonstrated injury sufficiently different from the general public to satisfy the
special injury requirement required by nuisance cases like the Columbia River Fishermen’s
Protective Ass’n case, discussed supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. See Blumm &
Wood, supra note 195, at 34–37.
271.
See supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing City of Oakland v. BP
P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017 (N.D. Cal. 2018)).
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a result would create a Catch-22 scenario and fly in the face of Congress’ apparent
intent to preserve common law remedies.272
If atmospheric nuisance cases reach the merits, the history of nuisance law
recounted in this Article suggests that the doctrine is fully capable of evolving to
provide the injured with a remedy. There is no doctrinal reason why the social utility
and scientific uncertainty issues that served defendants well in the late nineteenth
and twentieth century could not turn the reasonableness balancing in favor of
plaintiffs challenging atmospheric pollution. If so, the doctrine which evolved from
one protective of a stable agrarian society in the pre-modern era to accommodate
industrialization could, in the twenty-first century, evolve again to meet the greatest
environmental threat of contemporary America.

272.
See supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing the savings clauses in
the Clean Water Act, which are substantially similar to those contained in the Clean Air Act).
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